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JUDGING STATUTES:
INTERPRETIVE REGIMES
Nancy Staudt, Lee Epstein, Peter Wiedenbeck,
Rene Lindstiidt & Ryan J. Vander Wielen*
I. INTRODUCTION

Theories of statutory interpretation abound. Scholars, judges,
and commentators have long puzzled over the best method to locate
the meaning of a statute and to this end have proposed a range of
approaches that rely on various forms of evidence, including
statutory text, legislative intent, agency interpretations, cultural
norms, and judicial precedent.' These theories do not merely offer
* Nancy Staudt is Professor of Law at Washington University in St.
Louis; Lee
Epstein is the Edward Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor of
Political Science and Professor of Law at Washington University in St. Louis;
Peter J. Wiedenbeck is the Joseph H. Zumbalen Professor of Law and
Associate Dean of the Faculty at Washington University in St. Louis; Rent
Lindstddt and Ryan J. Vander Wielen are Ph.D. candidates in Political Science
at Washington University in St. Louis. We are grateful to the National Science
Foundation for supporting our research, to Andrew D. Martin for offering
useful comments, and to James J. Brudney and Corey Ditslear for providing us
with their data on civil rights cases. We used R (http://www.R-project.org)
and Stata to conduct the analyses and generate the graphs presented in
this article. The project's web site (http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/rationales
.html) houses the database. Please e-mail all correspondence to Nancy Staudt,
ncstaudt@wulaw.wustl.edu.
1. The literature here is voluminous; for an excellent introduction, see
WILLIAM

N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE

PUBLIC POLICY (2001)
[hereinafter ESKRIDGE ET AL.,
Of course, despite the number of studies, no consensus exists
as to how federal courts should use this evidence. See, e.g., WILLIAM N.
CREATION OF
LEGISLATION].

ESKRIDGE,

JR.,

DYNAMIC

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

130-81 (1994)

[hereinafter ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC INTERPRETATION] (defending an approach
that permits judicial reliance on text, legislative history, and contemporary
norms); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 29-37 (1997) (arguing for a textualist interpretive process);
Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the
Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory
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competing modes of analysis; they also highlight competition among
federal actors for control over the law-making process.2 An advocate
of a textualist or intentionalist reading of a statute argues for
bestowing special weight on the legislature, whether its product or its
process. One who supports interpreting statutes with deference to
administrative rulings privileges the executive over the judicial and
legislative branches in the interpretive process. Alternatively, those
who defend reliance on substantive canons, precedent, or broad
policy considerations in effect prioritize judge-made rules and
perceptions. Championing one theory over others, therefore, favors a
particular allocation of power within the federal government and for
this reason we refer to each particular mode of analysis-whether
textualism, intentionalism, deference, precedent, and so on-as a
component of larger interpretive regime: legislative, executive, or
judicial.3
Interpretation,68 TUL. L. REv. 803 (1994) (arguing for an interpretive process
that relies on text and legislative history); Daniel B. Rodriquez & Barry R.
Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New
Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 1417 (2003) (arguing for use of legislative history but only if statements
are made by pivotal voters in the legislative process); Stephen F. Ross &
Daniel Tranen, The Modem ParolEvidence Rule and Its Implicationsfor New
Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L.J. 195 (1998) (proposing that
federal courts rely on text and legislative history to achieve the best results).
2. Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of
Legitimacy in StatutoryInterpretation, 108 HARv. L. REV. 593, 616-17 (1995)
(providing a useful description of the various emerging theories of statutory
interpretation).
3. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEx. L. REV. 1073 (1992) (using a similar
conceptual scheme). Of course, we understand-and indeed later elaboratethe distinctions between and among the major components of each regime;
e.g., an emphasis on the plain meaning of a statute is quite distinct in many
respects from a stress on its legislative history. On the other hand, both imply
some degree of regard for the legislative product or process in ways that, say,
deference to administrative rulings may not. See, e.g., Beth M. Henschen,
Judicial Use of Legislative History and Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 10
LEGIS. STuD. Q. 353, 359-360 (1985) (claiming that the invocation of plain
meaning, legislative histories, and legislative intent all represent deference to
the legislature, though the degree of deference differs among them); see also
Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative
History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1, 5 (1998) (demonstrating the
"[j]ustices' consistent use of what I call judicially-selected policy norms").
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In this essay, we do not intend to defend an extant regime; many
others have done that.4 Nor do we seek to develop a novel
understanding of statutory interpretation; others have done that as
well.5 Rather, our goal is something more modest: to provide a
descriptive mapping of statutory interpretation in the business
context-specifically, in disputes over the meaning of the Internal
Revenue Code. To that end, we analyze every tax case decided by
the Supreme Court since Congress adopted the modem tax laws in
1909, with an eye toward identifying the various rationales deployed
beliefs about
by the justices, as well assessing some commonly-held
6
time.
over
interpretation
statutory
in
trends
Our analysis unfolds in four steps. We begin, in Part II, by
explaining our decisions to focus on interpretive regimes, to analyze
a population of cases resolved over a nine-decade period, and to
stress an economic aspect of judging. Parts III and IV describe the
database we amassed and report the results of our investigation into
rationales used by majority opinion writers since the early 1900s.
Taken as a whole, the data depict a Court that has privileged its own
precedent and judge-made rules over the preferences7 of the legis-8
lative or executive branches. In light of Schacter's and Zeppos'
research, this does not come as much of a surprise; they too
concluded that "judicially selected policy norms" predominate.
What is interesting, though, is that this overall finding masks a move
of some consequence: the justices may have prioritized their own
viewpoints and rules in the earliest years, but, by the 1960s, they
began to rely more heavily on both text and legislative history in
their interpretation of tax laws. This tendency to privilege the
legislature became firmly entrenched in the 1980s and continues
today. With regard to agency interpretations of statutes, the Court
has given progressively greater and greater deference to this form of
evidence over time but has never bestowed on the executive branch
the level of control allocated to itself and the legislative branch. In
4. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 1; Redish & Chung, supra note 1;
Rodriquez & Weingast, supra note 1; Ross & Tranen, supra note 1.
5. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC INTERPRETATION, supra note 1;
Schacter, supra note 3.

6. Congress adopted the corporate tax in 1909 and the income tax in 1913.
For more information on the number of cases in the study, see Part III.
7. Schacter, supra note 3.
8. Zeppos, supra note 3.
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Part V, we briefly explore these trends, as well as compare our
results to data drawn from civil rights litigation. 9 We conclude, in
Part VI, with suggestions for future research.
II. WHY INTERPRETIVE REGIMES? WHY A LONGITUDINAL, LARGE-N
STUDY? WHY THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF JUDGING?

The balance of this article profiles the contents of a database
housing information on the modes of statutory interpretation
deployed by the Court in 991 tax cases. Eventually we hope to use
these data in a larger study that seeks to explain: (1) why the justices
adopt certain interpretive regimes, and (2) how their choices affect
(a) the resolution of particular disputes and (b) their relations with
other political organizations (but especially Congress).
The
preliminary results that we report here may help resolve on-going
debates within law and the social sciences, if only because we study
"the actual-as opposed to assumed-interpretive practices of the
Supreme Court.
In what follows, we describe those current
debates and explain how they informed our research choicesspecifically the decision to focus on the Court's use of interpretive
regimes in economic disputes extending over a ninety-year period.
A. Interpretive Regimes
The task of construing statutes confronts judges with a widearray of interpretive choices--choices that come in the form of
regimes, theories," methods, 12 interpretive resources, 13 modes of
9. We are grateful to James G.Brudney & Corey Ditslear for providing
these data, which come from their Canons of Construction and the Elusive
Questfor Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1 (2005) (manuscript and data
on file with authors).
10. Schacter, supra note 3, at 56 (claiming that the "approach of legal
scholars to the 'ought' is insufficiently informed by a systematic study of the
'is').
11. See, e.g., Zeppos, supra note 3, at 1081, 1084 (explaining how
"dynamic theories" of statutory interpretation have come to "dominate" the
literature).
12. Daniel M. Schneider, Empirical Research on Judicial Reasoning:
Statutory Interpretationin Federal Tax Cases, 31 N.M. L. REv. 325, 327-30
(2001) (analyzing five "methods" of interpretation: strict construction [plain
meaning], deference to regulations, structure [purpose], legislative history,
practical reasoning).
13. See, e.g., Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 9 (manuscript at 27)
(describing the canons as a form of reasoning and coding what they deem ten
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analysis, 14 reasoning, 15 or forms of evidence, as scholars have
variously described or delineated them. Although the possibilities
are many in number and our mapping of them, as we explain in Part
IV, is sufficiently fine to capture the details of interest to some
scholars, our focus is on the Court's utilization of the broader
categories of the three major interpretive regimes: legislative, executive, and judicial.
This focus reflects our belief that the deployment of one or a
combination of regimes in any given case may unveil intriguing
features of judging and, more generally, of inter-branch dynamics
and policymaking. Chiefly, as other scholars have long asserted,
when judges reveal their reliance on one or another approach, they
may affect other players in the interpretive game. 16 So, on some
accounts, (for example, if judges commit to a textualist approach)
they may be signaling deference to Congress. But they also may be
telling legislators that they ought not to expend scarce resources on
constructing legislative documents filled with commentary on their
"interpretive resources": text, dictionaries, language canons, legislative history,
legislative purpose, legislative inaction, Supreme Court precedent, common
law precedent, substantive canons, and agency deference); Schacter, supra
note 3 (including nine "interpretive resources" in her analysis: statutory
language, legislative history, other statutes, judicial opinions, canons of
construction, administrative materials, secondary sources, dictionaries, and
miscellaneous others).
14. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word:
CongressionalResponse to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L.
REV. 425, 444 (1992) (coding four "modes of analysis": plain meaning,
legislative history, legislative intent, interest-balancing).
15. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., OverridingSupreme CourtStatutory
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 347 (1991) (labeling as
"reasoning" plain meaning, legislative history, canons, statutory precedents,
purpose and policy, common law & constitutional law); see also Brudney &
Ditslear, supra note 9 (analyzing the Court's use of legislative history and
other textual materials in formulating opinions).
16. See, e.g., Bernard W. Bell, Using Statutory Interpretation to Improve
the Legislative Process: Can It Be Done in the Post-Chevron Era?, 13 J.L. &
POL. 105, 110-12 (1997) (noting possible consequences of methodological
decisions in statutory interpretation); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARv. L. REv. 26, 39-42 (1994). But see
Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 74, 112-13 (2000)
(noting that, as an empirical matter, the consequences of adopting one
interpretive methodology over another are unclear); Schacter, supra note 3, at
13 ("The interpretive resources that appear in Supreme Court opinions...
offer guidance to lower courts, lawyers, and litigants.").
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underlying purposes or goals, and litigants should not search for this
17
evidence, as the court will ignore it in the decision-making process.
Alternatively, a judge committed to intentionalism may foster
precisely the opposite incentives-lawyers should fill their briefs
with excerpts from the documents, and legislators should work to
build a legislative
history in order to achieve their preferred
8
outcomes.'
Other accounts, however, suggest a different kind of relationship
between rationales and congressional reactions: one that places
greater emphasis on the constraints confronting judges as first-stage
interpreters, and not final policy makers, in the larger separation-ofpowers system. 19 Along these lines comes a series of commentary
reasoning that, because Congress is more likely to overturn decisions
relying on the plain meaning of a law, the Court should eschew
textualism as a primary mode of analysis.2 0 Others make precisely
17. See SCALIA, supra note 1, at 36-37 (noting that refusal to rely on
legislative history will save resources for both legislators and litigants); Sidney
A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819, 841 (1988)
(arguing that a textualist approach will lead to statutes with extraordinary
detail).
18. For a somewhat different account of the importance of legislative
history, see Edward P. Schwartz et al., A Positive Theory of Legislative Intent,
57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51 (1994), which offers a formal model showing
that "legislative history indicates to a Justice that he or she should examine the
statute more closely" because decisions deviating "too far from the intent of
the statute may be overturned by corrective legislation." Id. at 54.
19. See Eskridge, supra note 15; Schwartz et al., supra note 18; see also
infra notes 22-24 (noting scholars' arguments that judges invite legislative
override by invoking particular canons and rationales).
20. See e.g., Daniel J. Bussel, Textualism 's Failures:A Study of Overruled
Bankruptcy Decisions, 53 VAND. L. REv. 887 (2000) (discussing textualism
and finding courts that adopt this method are more likely to suffer
congressional override); Eskridge, supra note 15, at 374; Solimine & Walker,
supra note 14 (presenting data to show that Congress is more likely to overturn
textually-grounded decisions); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use
of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the
United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U.L. REv. 277, 308 (1990). Joining
these commentators is Justice John Paul Stevens, who famously wrote in his
dissent:
In recent years the Court has vacillated between a purely literal
approach to the task of statutory interpretation and an approach that
seeks guidance from historical context, legislative history, and prior
cases identifying the purpose that motivated the legislation. Thus, for
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the opposite claim, arguing that the legislature is more likely to
overturn non-textually-grounded decisions. 2 1 A third group asserts
rationales fully aware of-even
that judges may invoke particular
22

inviting-a legislative override.

What all these predictions have in common may be more
intriguing than their differences. The rationales are akin to instru23
ments that justices wield strategically to obtain certain results.
example, in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412
(1978), we rejected a "mechanical construction," of the fee-shifting
provision in § 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that
the prevailing defendant had urged upon us ....

That holding rested

entirely on our evaluation of the relevant congressional policy and
found no support within the four corners of the statutory text.
Nevertheless, the holding was unanimous and, to the best of my
knowledge, evoked no adverse criticism or response in Congress.
On those occasions, however, when the Court has put on its thick
grammarian's spectacles and ignored the available evidence of
congressional purpose and the teaching of prior cases construing a
statute, the congressional response has been dramatically different. It
is no coincidence that the Court's literal reading of Title VII, which
led to the conclusion that disparate treatment of pregnant and
nonpregnant persons was not discrimination on the basis of sex was
repudiated by the 95th Congress ....
In the domain of statutory interpretation, Congress is the master. It
obviously has the power to correct our mistakes, but we do the country
a disservice when we needlessly ignore persuasive evidence of
Congress' actual purpose and require it "to take the time to revisit the
matter" and to restate its purpose in more precise English whenever its
work product suffers from an omission or inadvertent error.
W.V. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 112-13, 115 (1991) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
21. See, e.g., Beth Henschen, Statutory Interpretations of the Supreme
Court: CongressionalResponses, 11 AM. POL. Q. 441, 444 (1983) (suggesting
that Congress is more likely to overturn anti-trust decisions than those
involving labor because "[w]hile labor law is written in fairly specific terms,
antitrust policy is... defined by Congress with broad strokes"); Solimine &
Walker, supra note 14, at 442 (hypothesizing that "Congress is more likely to
modify decisions that are based on something other than a 'plain meaning'
analysis, because cases which engage in more vague reliance on policy
goals.., are more apt to trigger [a] reaction by attentive publics").
22. See Pablo T. Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller, Invitations to Override:
CongressionalReversals of Supreme Court Decisions, 16 INT'L REv. L. &
ECON. 503, 504 (1996); see also infra note 26 (describing Spiller and Tiller's
findings).
23. For more on the idea of strategic instrumentation in a variety of
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Nonetheless, further exploration of the extant literature is not critical
here. What is important for our purposes is simply this: while the
existence of institutional signaling (as well as the implicit bargains
that branches within the federal government may reach in the lawmaking process) has not escaped scholars, 24 many specific claims
about the relationship between rationales and inter-branch decision
making have been the subject of little rigorous scrutiny. 15 By
producing a reliable and valid mapping of regime deployment-a
mapping that promotes further systematic investigations-we hope
our data will lay an empirical foundation for these interesting
debates. At the very least, identifying the various regimes is
necessary to develop robust models capable of assessing particular
hypotheses about the interactions between the Court and Congress.
B. Longitudinaland Large N

Many scholars have stressed intra-court decision making and, in
particular, the relationship (or lack thereof) between the use of
particular modes of interpretation and the types of judges who use
them, as well as the results those judges reach. Some commentators,
for example, assert that "liberal" judges make use of some theories
(e.g., legislative intent) while eschewing others (e.g., plain meaning),
contexts, see, for example, Lee Epstein et al., Dynamic Agenda Setting on the
United States Supreme Court: An Empirical Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 395 (2002); Joseph L. Smith & Emerson H. Tiller, The Strategy of
Judging: Evidence From Administrative Law, 31 J. LEGAL STuD. 61 (2002);
Emerson H. Tiller & Pablo T. Spiller, Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure
and PoliticalGames in AdministrativeLaw, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 349 (1999).
24. For a brief discussion of institutional signaling and implicit bargains,
see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 16, at 39-42. See also JEFFREY S. BANKS,
SIGNALING GAMES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 3-6 (1991) (arguing that, even with
incomplete information between parties, signals can be sent between one
another, which affects the decision making process).
25. And some of the scrutiny that does exist reaches different conclusions.
Cf, Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 9; Michael H. Koby, The Supreme
Court's Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The Impact of Justice
Scalia 's Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 369 (1999) (concluding that Scalia's
presence on the Court has led to a decline in the Court's use of legislative
history in statutory analysis); Stephanie Wald, The Use of Legislative History
in Statutory InterpretationCases in the 1992 U.S. Supreme Court Term; Scalia
Rails But Legislative History Remains on Track, 23 Sw. U.L. REV. 47 (1993)
(maintaining the Court "continues to look at legislative history in cases where
the meaning of a federal statute is at issue").
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and that these choices have consequences for a dispute's ultimate
resolution (and, perhaps, as we suggest above, for its ultimate
reception in Congress). Others seem to agree that different sorts of
judges rely on one type of rationale to the neglect of others but doubt
the importance of that reliance for case outcomes. 26 Then there are
those who dispute the idea that liberal judges are more likely than
their conservative counterparts to deploy particular rationales but that
the rationales are consequential in any event. 27 Still another set of
scholars takes issue with the notion of a28relationship between
rationales and outcomes in virtually any form.
This controversy may be distinct from debates over the effect of
interpretive regimes on Congress, but in at least one way, it is
similar. In both cases, the vast majority of arguments marshaled by
participants have not been subjected to enough serious empirical
scrutiny. And that, in part, explains why we made the decision to
systematically inspect a full complement of cases-all tax disputes
resolved by the Supreme Court-and take inventory of all the
rationales invoked in them.
But that is not our only reason, nor should it be, since several
scholars already have systematically tallied rationales. Brudney and
26. See, e.g., Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court
and the Use of Legislative Histories:A StatisticalAnalysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J.
294 (1982); Koby, supra note 25. Along somewhat different lines is Spiller
and Tiller's work, which suggests that it may be -difficult for judges
simultaneously to apply their most preferred "rule" (e.g., plain meaning) and to
reach their most preferred policy outcome (e.g., a holding in favor of the
taxpayer) because "there is no guarantee that application of a preferred judicial
rule will achieve the justices' preferred policy outcome." Spiller & Tiller,
supra note 22, at 504. Accordingly, justices may occasionally apply a rule
they favor to reach an outcome they dislike and that they believe Congress will
dislike as well (and thus override) in an effort to achieve both rule and policy
goals. See id. at 504-05.
27. See, e.g., Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 9 (manuscript at 64-65);
Henschen, supra note 3, at 363; Wald, supra note 25, at 69 ("Of those who
have looked to legislative history, ideological bent is not determinative.")
28. Some within this group simply portray interpretive regimes as
smokescreens for judicial preferences. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE A'T1TUDINAL MODEL

REVISITED (2002); HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE
OR MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME

COURT (1999); Glenn A. Phelps & John B. Gates, The Myth of Jurisprudence,
31 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 567 (1991) (focusing exclusively on constitutional,
not statutory, disputes).
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29
Ditslear, for example, considered ten "canons of construction"
invoked by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts in work-place related
litigation; 30 Zeppos counted regime-based authorities cited by the
Court in 413 randomly selected cases decided between 1890 and

1990; 3 1 Eskridge examined the Court's primary reasoning in a

sample of disputes (size 275) resolved between 1978 and 1984;32
Solimine & Walker coded four modes of analysis used in the 2,017
cases in which the Burger Court interpreted a federal law; 33 and
Schneider scrutinized the underlying judicial reasoning deployed by
lower federal courts in 482 tax cases. 34 Judge Patricia Wald
described the use of legislative history and textualism during the
Court's 198135 and 1988 terms, 36 and Stephanie Wald did the same
for the 1991 term. 37 More recently, Schacter systematically analyzed
the Court's deployment of various rationales during the 1996 term.3 8
On the one hand, the lessons from these and other empirical
studies have been invaluable for our project, 39 and readers will see
them sprinkled throughout. On the other hand, existing studies do
have their limits. Primarily, most are so circumscribed in timeZeppos is a notable exception here4° -that they cannot shed much
light on questions of great interest, such as the effect of "key actors'

29. Brudney & Distlear, supra note 9 (manuscript at 9).
30. Id. (manuscript at 18).
31. Zeppos, supra note 3, at 1088.
32. Eskridge, supra note 15, at 350-53.
33. Solimine & Walker, supra note 14, at 444.
34. Schneider, supra note 12, at 332-33.
35. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observationsof the Use of Legislative History
in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195 (1983).
36. Wald, supra note 20.
37. Wald, supra note 25, at 49; see also Koby, supra note 25, at 384-85
(counting citations to legislative history materials in cases decided by the
Supreme Court between 1980 and 1998).
38. Schacter, supra note 3, at 18-19.
39. Other studies include Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S.
Supreme Court and the Use ofLegislative Histories: A StatisticalAnalysis, 22
JURIMETRiCS J. 294 (1982); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37
UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990); Henschen, supra note 3; Thomas W. Merrill,
Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351
(1994).
40. Zeppos, supra note 3 (examining cases decided between 1890 and
1990); see also Carro & Brann, supra note 39 (exploring the Court's use of

legislative history between 1938 and 1979).
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preference changes" on the use of particular rationales.4 For that
matter, they may be unable to support inferences about the period
they analyze (e.g., making claims about the Rehnquist Court based
on the 1996 term).
The latter is of particular concern in light of a question over
which scholars have spilt no shortage of ink: whether regime change
has occurred over time. Writing in the 1950s, for example, Fisher &
Harbison speculated that the justices were increasingly relying on
committee reports, floor debates, and other materials designed to
divine the legislature's intent. 42 Carro and Brann provided empirical
support for this speculation, as did Judge Wald. Her analysis of the
198143 and 1988 terms, in which she found that the Court invoked
legislative history materials in the majority of its cases, led her to
conclude that "[n]o occasion for statutory [interpretation] now exists
when the Court will not look at the legislative history. 4 5 Just four
years later, though, Merrill asserted that the tide had turned yet
again-this time away from intentionalism and towards Justice
Scalia's (new) textualism. 46 Specifically, Merrill found that the
percentage of cases making "'substantive use' of legislative history"
had decreased monotonically from 100 in 1981 to 75 in 1988 to 18 in
1992-a decline he attributed directly to Scalia. 47 "At first [Scalia's]
effort seemed quixotic and appeared to have little impact on the other
Justices," Merrill wrote. 48 "Over time, however, Justice Scalia's
influence.., has grown, to the point where it now ,apears... [to
have] achieved a substantial measure of success. 9 Stephanie
41. But cf. Zeppos, supra note 3, at 1122-24 (arguing judges use
recognized legal authority to justify a value choice).
42. Glendon M. Fisher, Jr. & William J. Harbison, Trends in the Use of
Extrinsic Aids in StatutoryInterpretation,3 VAND. L. REv. 586 (1950).
43. Wald, supra note 35.
44. Wald, supra note 20.
45. Wald, supra note 35, at 195 (emphasis omitted).
46. Merrill, supra note 39. For Scalia's approach, see SCALIA, supra note
1. For commentary on his "new" textualism, see Eskridge, supra note 39;
William D. Popkin, An "Internal" Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of
Statutory Interpretation, 76 MIN. L. REv. 1133 (1992); Nicholas S. Zeppos,
Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L.
REv. 1597 (1991).
47. Merrill, supra note 39, at 355-56.
48. Id. at 355.
49. Id.; see also Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in
Interpreting Statutes, 65 S.CAL. L. REV. 845, 846 (1992) (claiming that the
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Wald's analysis of the same term (1992), on the other hand, found
that over 85 percent of the Court's statutory decisions continued to
cite legislative history, 50 though Schacter's more recent study (of the
1996 term) falls somewhere between Wald and Merrill. 51 Schacter
found a 49 percent "rate of legislative history usage" which is less
than Wald's 75 percent figure but "nearly triple the rate that Merrill
observed in analyzing the 1992 Term." 5 Based on these findings,
Schacter declared that "[i]t would be premature to declare the trend
against legislative history to have reversed itself' 53 and that "the
trend toward textualism is reversing." 54 Koby, however, would
strongly disagree with both conclusions. His study of citations to
legislative history between 1980 and 1998 reveals that before Scalia
ascended to the Court, 3.47 citations to legislative history appeared
(on average) in each decision; after Scalia's arrival, that figure
dropped to 1.87.55
Undoubtedly, some of this disagreement, as well as other ongoing debates in the literature, stems from the particular time periods
under analysis and, more broadly, from the researcher's design
choices (e.g., the decision to focus on a small number of cases, 56 a
"Supreme Court's actual use of legislative history is in decline"); Brudney &
Ditslear, supra note 9 (both finding a decline in the Rehnquist Court's use of
legislative history materials); Eskridge, supra note 39 (same).
50. Wald, supra note 25, at 49.

51. Schacter, supra note 3.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 37.
Koby, supranote 25, at 386.

56. We have thus far limited our discussion to studies examining at least

one term, but other studies examine a handful or fewer. See, e.g., William D.
Araiza, The Trouble with Robertson: Equal Protection, the Separation of
Powers, and the Line Between Statutory Amendment and Statutory
Interpretation, 48 CATH. U. L. REv. 1055 (1999) (discussing a study of

statutory interpretation in the context of one key case); Bernard W. Bell,
Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The Public Justification
Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1999) (citing

analysis of two major Supreme Court cases in defense of the statutory
interpretation method); R. Wilson Freyermuth, Are Security Deposits "Security
Interests"? The Proper Scope of Article 9 and Statutory Interpretation in
Consumer Class Actions, 68 MO. L. REv. 71 (2003) (investigating two

decisions and arguing the cases rest on a flawed understanding of Article 9 of
the UCC); Lawrence M. Solan, Should Criminal Statutes Be Interpreted
Dynamically?, in ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, (Berkeley Electronic Press
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particular term or era, 57 a random sample of a large number of
cases,5 8 or a population5 9) but other factors contribute as well.
Perhaps the most consequential are: (1) how the researchers went
about inventorying rationales; (2) whether they considered only
instances of statutory interpretation or included constitutional analysis as well; and (3) the type and number of laws (or legal areas)
scrutinized.
As to the first, three different approaches appear in the literature.
One, "exemplified" by Zeppos,6 ° Carro & Brann,6 ' and Koby,6 2 is to
comb Court decisions for citations to particular types of authority
(e.g., committee reports, past Court decisions, and so on) and then
generate summary statistics. For example, Zeppos found that in the
413 randomly-drawn Court cases included in his study of the period
between 1890 and 1990, the justices relied on judicial sources in
93.2, legislative in 87.7, and executive in 23.5 percent of the cases.6 3
To the extent that Zeppos clearly identifies the materials he
placed into each of these categories, his study is a model. But for all
the reasons Zeppos recognizes, 64 the approach of counting authorities
without assessing whether they were nothing more than passing
references is not ideal. Most subsequent scholars have thus
eschewed it for one of the two others: reading the Court decision and
coding a primary, dominant rationale, 65 or coding all rationales on
which the opinion writer claimed to have relied.66 The former
certainly has some value but, then again, as Eskridge, a scholar who
has used the approach, has noted, it suffers a serious drawback: "the
Court almost never relies on just one reason." 67 The latter also has
problems, but we think, and the most recent studies inventorying

2002), at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art8/ (exploring statutory interpretation in three criminal law decisions).
57. E.g., Schacter, supra note 3; Wald, supra note 25.
58. E.g., Eskridge, supra note 15; Zeppos, supra note 3.

59. E.g., Carro & Brann, supra note 39; Koby, supra note 25.
60. Zeppos, supra note 3.

61. Carro & Brann, supra note 39.
62. Koby, supra note 25.
63. Zeppos, supra note 3, at 1093.
64. Id., app. B.

65. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 15, at 347 n.38.
66. See, e.g., Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 9; Schacter, supra note 3.
67. See Eskridge, supra note 15, at 347 n.38.
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rationales would seem to concur, 68 that its benefits well outweigh the
costs. Accordingly, and as we explain in more detail in Part IV, in
evaluating the Court's use of rationales, we coded them all based on
which rationale the majority (or plurality) relied on to reach its
not merely count authorities, nor do we include passing
result; we do
69
references.
A second distinction among existing studies is whether they
focused on the use of interpretive rationales or regimes in the
statutory or constitutional context, or both. To us, combining the two
is a mistake under any circumstances. The justices themselves may
reject particular regimes in one context but not in another; 70 and, of
course, owing to Congress' inability to overturn constitutional
decisions by a simple majority, the nature of the relationship between
the legislature and the judiciary may be quite distinct across the two
areas. 7 1 In any event, because only statutory interpretation interests
us, we do not include 72cases that the Court resolved exclusively on
constitutional grounds.
C. The Economic Context of Judging
This brings us to the third distinction among existing studies: the
number and type of laws (or legal areas) considered. Beginning with
the former, some researchers, perhaps the majority, fold many into
one study. Zeppos, for example, relies on a random sample of all

68. See, e.g., Brudney & Distlear, supra note 9; Schacter, supra note 3.

69. Our coding is thus similar to the one used by Brudney and Ditslear in
Brudney & Ditslear supra note 9 (manuscript at 28) (focusing on interpretive
resources "relied upon as affirmatively probative to help the majority reach its
result; or... relied upon as 'a' or 'the' determining factor in the majority's
[I]n both instances the resource contributes in a
reasoning process ....
justification for its holding.")
the
majority
to
meaningful way
70. It is well known, for example, that Scalia opposes the use of legislative
history materials to construe laws, and while he does not seek the intent of the
Framers in constitutional interpretation, he does search for the "original
understanding" of the text's meaning. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The
Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 853 (1989).
71. See Eskridge, supra note 15. But see Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme
Court as a StrategicNational Policy Maker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583 (2001).

72. In 127 of the 991 cases in our study (or 12.82 percent), the Court
interpreted a constitutional provision and a section of the Internal Revenue
Code. In this essay, we discuss only rationales employed in the interpretation
of the Code, not the constitutional provisions.
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statutory interpretation cases; 73 Wald examines all cases during the
1991 term; 74 and Brudney and Ditslear scrutinize all workplacerelated decisions (constitutional and statutory).75 We see the logic
here, but, at the same time, take note of studies comparing different
laws finding that even the same justices deploy different rationales to
interpret them.76

Given variation in statutes (e.g., in their text and

history), this finding hardly comes as a surprise, but it is one that
counsels caution in combining legal areas. We heed that warning
and, as we explain
momentarily, focus on one statute, the Internal
77
Revenue Code.

Turning to the studies that tend to focus on one legal area or
statute, we find, in contrast, little variation: the focus is almost
always on some dimension of civil rights-to the neglect of complex
economic and financial questions. 78 To us, the neglect of these issues
is quite consequential; it means that, however sophisticated and
insightful extant studies may be, our knowledge of statutory
interpretation is incomplete at best and downright biased at worst.
Perhaps the best evidence of our claim emanates from the
Supreme Court itself-specifically, from its plenary docket. As
Figure 1 makes clear, while the Justices occasionally granted
certiorari to more petitions involving civil rights (e.g., 1969 term),

73. Zeppos, supra note 3.
74. Wald, supranote 25.
75. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 9 (manuscript at 18). Worth noting,
though, is that these scholars disaggregate the data to draw comparisons
between and among issues-a worthwhile task.
76. Id.; Henschen, supra note 3; Henschen, supra note 21.
77. This is not, of course, an entirely satisfactory solution since the most
recent Code contains thousands of sections that govern many different
dimensions of taxation. We analyzed the section(s) and subjects individually
but here only report the overall (and not section-by-section or subject-bysubject) results.
78. This is as true of studies of rationales as it is of case outcomes. See,
e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History?: Playing the Court!
Congress/PresidentCivil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REv. 613, 642-46, 664-66
(1991); Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-PowersGames in the Positive Theory
of Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 28, 41, 42-43 (1997) (study of
case outcome in civil rights context). Notable exceptions include Schneider,
supra note 12; Pablo T. Spiller & Rafael Gely, Congressional Control or
Judicial Independence: The Determinants of US. Supreme Court LaborRelation Decisions 1949-1988, 23 RAND J. EcON. 463 (1992).
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over the five-decade period, they devoted more of their scarce docket
slots to (and resolved far more) economic controversies.

t

' •
":III

v4

I

ewn0

-

--

-

-

CM R•

Figure 1: Civil rights and economics cases as a proportion
of all statutory interpretation cases orally argued before the
Supreme Court, 1953-2003 terms.7 9
Moving from the large categories of "economics" and "civil
rights" towards particular pieces of legislation does not undermine to
this conclusion about the prevalence of economic or financial
disputes. As Epstein et al. report,8 0 the justices of the Vinson (19461952 terms) and Warren (1953-1968 terms) Courts not only granted
review to a disproportionate number of petitions centering on
economically oriented laws, but they also focused on the Internal
79. N=2949. Computed from Harold J. Spaeth's U.S. Supreme Court Data
Base (Dec. 9, 2004 release), at http://as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/
sctdata.htm, with the following code (in Stata):
generate civrights= 1 if (analu-0) & (dec type- 1 - dec type==6 dec type=7) & (authdec I l4 - authdec2=4) & (value=2) replace
civrights--0 if civrights=.
generate economic-l if (analu==0) & (dec type==l - dec type6
- dec type==7) & (authdecl- 4 - authdec2=-4) & (value8)
replace economic=0 if economic.
80. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 653 (2003).
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Revenue Code in particular. It was the "most litigated law" during
both these eras, followed by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (during the
Vinson Court) and the National Labor Relations Act (as amended)
(during the Warren Court).8 ' These trends show no sign of abating.
Between the 1986 and 2003 terms, as we depict in Figure 2, the
Supreme Court decided more statutory controversies involving the
tax code than any other federal statute. Importantly too, most all
other laws making frequent appearances in the Court also were
outside the realm of civil rights, including the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Bankruptcy Code, and the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act.
Internal Revenue Code
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Bankruptcy Code and Acts
Employmee Retirement Income Security
Habeas Corpus (28 USC 2241-2255)
Socal Security Act
Civil Rights Act, Section 1983
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title 7
Federal Rules of Crirninal Procedure
Imnmigration and Naturalization Acts
National Labor Relations Act
Voting Rights Act of 1965
Securities Acts
RICO
Adinistrative Procedure
Americans with Disablities Act
Federal Rules of Evidence
Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Cvi Rights Attorneys! Fees Awads
0

10

20

30

40

50

Nurnber of Cases

Figure 2: Most litigated laws during the Rehnquist court
era, 1986-2002 terms. The Social Security Act includes
Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Medicaid,
Medicare, and Supplemental Security Income. Securities
Acts include the Securities Act of 1933,
the Securities and
82
Exchange Act, and the Williams Act.
81. Id.
82. Computed from Harold J. Spaeth's U.S. Supreme Court Data Base,
supra note 79, (October 14, 2004 release), at http://as.uky.edu/polisci/
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III. OUR STUDY: THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE

If the Supreme Court's docket suggests anything about the
importance of a legal question, then these data underscore a point we
made at the onset: it seems clear that scholars can only develop a
complete picture of judicial behavior in the context of statutory
disputes--of both the rationales employed and the outcomes
reached-by incorporating economic controversies into their
analyses.
Certainly investigating the full range of economic or financial
disputes-suits involving labor, bankruptcy, anti-trust, and so onwould be optimal. Owing to the usual constraints, however, we
focus on just one type: tax cases. This concentration reflects the
substantive expertise of two of the authors (Staudt and Wiedenbeck)
as well as the simple fact that the Internal Revenue Code has
received more play in the Supreme Court (at least since 1946) than
any other law. Likewise, as we noted earlier, we see value in
focusing on one particular law rather than on multiple statutes or
areas. In short, even if we have a limited ability to reach highquality inferences about other economic laws from our study of the
for a study
Internal Revenue Code, tax seems the best starting point
83
context.
understudied
this
in
of statutory interpretation
Conducting the investigation required us to identify all Supreme
Court cases that interpreted the tax code and analyze each case to
determine the mode(s) of analyses the Court employed to interpret
the particular section of the code at issue in the dispute. In Part IV,
we explain modes of analyses in some detail. Here we focus on case
identification.
We began our search for disputes over the Internal Revenue
ulmerproject/sctdata.htm, using the law variable if (in Stata): (analu-O analu-3 - analu-=5) & (dec type= 1 - dec type6 - dec type==7) &
(term L,19 85 & term != 2003).
83. We have more to say about generalizing the results of our study to other
types of laws in Part VI, infra. Worth noting here, though, is that we recognize
taxation may be distinct from other areas because of the "rapid interplay
between Congress and the Court in this area." Note, CongressionalReversal
of Supreme Court Decisions: 1945-1957, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1324, 1324 n.3
(1958); see also Eskridge, supra note 15, at 344 (providing data to show that
tax decisions are disproportionately overridden by Congress); Solimine &
Walker, supra note 14, at 445 (same). At the least, this is why the Harvard
note writer excluded tax from an inventory of cases reversed by Congress.
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Code by locating every case in the Supreme Court that mentioned the
word "tax." 84 We then reviewed the cases yielded by the search,
retaining only those that involved the interpretation of a federal tax
statute. This procedure led to the exclusion of state taxation cases, as
well as those involving tax fraud, jurisdictional questions, evidentiary issues, and constitutional controversies that did not involve
a statutory interpretation problem. At the end of the culling process,
we were left with 922 distinct cases, distributed over nearly ninety
Supreme Court terms (1912-2000).5
As Figure 3 shows, however, those 922 cases are not evenly
dispersed. Whether we consider the sheer number of taxation
lawsuits (the bottom panel) or their fraction of the plenary docket
(the top panel), the Court heard the bulk of the cases in the first half
of the 20th century, and the numbers dropped precipitously after that
time.86 Indeed, from a high water mark of 0.41 in 1935-meaning
that tax cases occupied 41 percent(!) of the plenary docket-the
proportion fell as low as 0.07 fifty years later, in 1985. Moreover,
after the 1940s, the number of tax cases had tapered off considerably,
from forty-six cases in 1940 down to eight just two decades later in
1960 and five in 2000.

84. We identified these cases via the following Lexis search: (federal w/s
tax!) or (excise w/s tax!) or (estate w/s tax!) or (user w/5 fee) or (user w/s tax!)
or (tax! w/s fraud) or (irc) or (i.r.c.) or (stamp w/s tax!) or (income w/s tax!) or
(internal w/s revenue) or (tax! w/s lien) or (tax! w/s code) or (tax! w/s evad!) or
(tax! w/s evasion) or (corporate w/s tax!) or (payroll w/s tax!) or (employment
w/s tax!) or (social w/s security) or (26 usc) or (26 u.s.c.) or (tax! w/s refund)
or (tax! w/s deficiency) or (unemployment w/s tax!) or (gift w/s tax!) or (fica
w/s tax!) or (f.i.c.a. w/s tax!).
85. The 922 figure includes only orally argued cases that resulted in a per

curiam opinion or a judgment or opinion of the Court. It also reflects cases
identified by citation rather than docket number. In other words, if the Court
collapsed three petitions under one docket number, we counted that case only
once, not three times.

86. The mean across the 89 terms is 11.261, with a standard deviation of

10.333.
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docket, 1912-2000 terms. N-99 1. The top panel shows the
87
number of cases; the bottom panel shows their proportion.

87. The N for this figure is indeed 991, not 922. For an explanation, see
Part IV, infra.
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Nonetheless, we should not take these declines, as precipitous as
they may appear, to mean that tax cases are no longer present on the
Court's docket. Quite the opposite. In terms of coverage, in all but
one term since 1912 (the 1998 term) the Court has interpreted the
Code at least once. Moreover, as the top panel of Figure 3 shows,
computing tax disputes as a proportion of the total plenary docket-a
step we should take in light of the decline in the number of cases the
Court decides each term-yields an 8 percent figure that has held
rather steady over the years. The exception here is the period
between 1930-1940 when the Court's docket was literally overflowing with tax cases.
IV. INTERPRETIVE REGIMES IN THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT

With 922 tax cases in hand, we set out to identify the section of
the tax code at issue and the approach(es) to statutory interpretation
the Court adopted in reaching its conclusion. Because we are
interested in how the Court treats each code provision, the unit of
analysis for our investigation is the code section, and not the casethereby bringing our total number of units to 991 (in other words, in
6988 of the 922 cases the Court interpreted two or more sections of
the tax code).89 We then examined each section separately and
coded the particular rationale(s) (e.g., plain meaning, agency
deference, precedent) the Court adopted for purposes of endowing
the statutory provision with meaning. As we noted earlier, we did
not limit ourselves to one rationale; we coded as many as the Court
employed. Finally, we grouped the rationales into one of three
regimes: legislative, executive, or judicial.
In sections to follow, we organize our discussion around the
three regimes, explaining them (and the more particular rationales
that they subsume) in some detail and providing descriptive data on
the approaches the Court stated it adopted on each tax question it
considered. Our purpose in so doing, as we noted at the onset, is to
determine how the Supreme Court claimed it allocated power among

88. Of those sixty-nine cases, the Court scrutinized two sections of the code

in sixty-one of them, and three sections in the remaining eight.
89. Even though our unit of analysis is, in fact, the section and not the case,
for purposes of explication, we use the term "case" throughout to describe our
units.
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the different branches of the federal government in the interpretive
process.
In undertaking this task, we recognize, as did Schacter in her
study of rationales, that "[t]he use of particular argumentative
resources [that appear] in opinions does not tell us how the writer of
the opinion actually reached her decision, only how she decided to
present and justify it;" 90 that is why we emphasize the terms "stated"
and "claimed." It may very well be the case, as literature we
reviewed earlier suggests, 91 that the justices appear to defer to the
legislative or executive branch, when, in fact, they are merely using
the canons, rules, and evidence as a means to justify their preferred
(and predetermined) outcome in the case. In other words, the Court
may suggest it is allocating power to others, thereby downplaying its
own role in the process, while in fact it is retaining power and control
for itself.
The extent to which the Court deploys rationales in this way is
question-but one that we cannot hope to address
empirical
an
without a detailed mapping of those rationales. It is for this reason,
and the others we considered in Part II, that our enterprise takes on
special importance. To reiterate, we fully concur with Schacter when
she writes that the sorts of data we describe below-the legislative,
judicial, and executive regimes deployed by the Court-may not
reveal "how Justices are actually deciding cases" but nonetheless
have "consequences" because they "help to set the boundaries for
statutory interpretation by legitimating particular resources and
approaches [and] ... offer guidance to lower courts, lawyers, and
litigants." 92
A. The Legislative Regime
The legislative model of statutory interpretation perceives the
federal judiciary as an important player in the interpretive process
but nonetheless posits that the Court should have little or even no
substantive policy-making role. 93 Theorists who support this model
90.
91.
92.
93.

Schacter, supra note 3, at 13.
Seesupranote 28.
Schacter, supra note 3, at 13.
In describing the various regimes, not to mention their components, we

are necessarily brief: space limitations prevent us from reviewing the large and
ever-growing literature. Again, for an informed review, see ESKRLDGE ET AL.,
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argue that Congress is the branch of government primarily
responsible for making law and the justices must serve as agents of
Congress in the interpretive process (the executive branch appears to
be irrelevant). The justices, as faithful agents, must decipher
congressional commands found in statutory law and apply them to
the particular case at hand, avoiding the inclination to privilege their
own viewpoints, those of the president, or the people-at-large above
those of the legislators reflected in the statute and other relevant
documents. 94 Although various commentators debate the means and
the scope of the evidence by which justices should go about
uncovering legislative mandates, each group believes the Court must:
(1) respect the democratic process and avoid acting as a "superlegislature" and (2) implement the enacting legislature's commands.
There are, of course, many variants of the legislative model. In
what follows, we focus on three of the more prominent: textualism,
intentionalism, and purposivism.
1. The Legislative Product: Textualism
Textualism requires that judges look to the words of the statute
in the interpretive process. This mandate stems from the idea that
only the statutory language represents the law; what congressional
members wanted to say, or expected or assumed would happen if
they had thought of a particular case, is not relevant because only the
words of the statute were subjected to bicameral consideration and
were presented to the president for approval or veto as required
under Article I, section 7 of the Constitution.9 5 Theorists who
supra note 1.
94. Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52

LEGISLATION,

U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 32-33 (1985) (requiring federal courts defer to the
legislature in the interpretive process under separation of powers); Redish &
Chung, supra note 1, at 805 (stating the originalist interpretive model's view
that a "judge's role as interpreter is limited to deciphering these commands and
applying them to particular cases"); Cass Sunstein, Justice Scalia's
Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529, 532 (1998) (reviewing ANTONIN
SCALIA ET AL., A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE

LAW (1997)) (stating the goal of any system of interpretation is to constrain
judicial discretion).
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (requiring bicameral legislative approval and
presentment to the president before a bill can become law); see SCALIA, supra
note 1; FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES (1991) (advocating
formalistic statutory interpretation); John F. Coverdale, Text as Limit: A Plea
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support the textualist approach argue that the method enables the
enacting Congress to predict the effects of its language and, at the
same time, stays the hand of activist justices who might interpret
statutes according to their own political preferences.9 Although
most textualists agree their approach may lead courts to interpret
statutory language contrary to the enacting Congress' expectations,
they argue this is not necessarily countermajoritarian in the long run
because Congress will learn that courts adhere to formalistic
statutory interpretation and, thus, will recognize its ability to control
the judiciary through clear drafting. 97 Textualism, then, will
discourage the Court from bending statutes and distorting the law's
plain meaning to fit an alleged purpose and, at the same time, will
encourage legislators to be more transparent in the law-making
process-both democracy enhancing outcomes. 98 To capture the
cases that relied upon the textualist approach, thereby "privileging"
the legislative branch and, in particular, its final product (i.e., the
statute itself), we inspected each case for its reliance on the canons or
modes of interpretation that emphasize the words of the tax code.
Specifically, we coded for the Court's reliance on the following

for a Decent Respect for the Tax Code, 71 TuL. L. REv. 1501, 1557 (1997)
(arguing that a court that ignores statutory text is "probably imposing its own
view of good tax policy in preference to the provisions actually enacted by
Congress"); John Copeland Nagle, Newt Gingrich, Dynamic Statutory
Interpreter,143 U. PA. L. REv. 2209, 2236 (1995); Adrian Vermeule, Dynamic
Statutory Interpretationand the Institutional Turn, 5 BERKELEY ELEC. PRESS
(2002); Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 113-49
(2000). The textualists' argument that judges must look to the words of the
statute is not unique-all statutory interpretation theorists agree that judges
must look to the words of the statute in order to resolve legal controversies.
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REv.
1509, 1557 (1998) ("All major theories of statutory interpretation consider the
statutory text primary. The plain meaning of a text, as applied to a set of facts,
is the focal point for attention whether one is a textualist, intentionalist, or
pragmatic interpreter of statutes"). The textualists are unique in that they
require the judge stop with the words and look no further in the interpretive
process.
96. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989); see also
Eskridge, supra note 95, at 1549 (citing Finley).
97. Indeed, this may explain why some studies report a higher risk of
reversal for Court decisions that invoke this approach as opposed to, say,
intentionalism.
98. See Eskridge, supra note 95, at 1550.
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00
thirteen textual canons 99 or rationales: 1
1. Avoid rendering language superfluous.
2. Ejusdem generis: where general words follow specific
words, the general words are construed to embrace only
objects similar in nature to those enumerated by the preceding specific words. Where the opposite sequence is
found (i.e., specific words following general ones) the
doctrine is equally applicable and restricts application of the
general term to things that are similar to those enumerated.10 '
3. Expressio unius: the enumeration of certain things in a
statute suggests that the legislators did not intend to include
things not listed.
4. Legislative drafting mistakes should be ignored.
5. Nosciture a sociies: the meaning of one term is "known
by its associates" (i.e., understood in the context of other
words in the list).
6. Placement of a section has no relevance.
7. Placement of a section has relevance.
8. Plain, ordinary meaning of the law: adherence to the
common usage or common understanding of the words.
9. Punctuation, grammar, syntax: the act of looking to
punctuation, grammar, or syntax to decide meaning of the
law. 102

99. See Eskridge, supra note 39, at 663-64 (analyzing the textualists'
interest in seeking "a revival of canons that rest upon precepts of grammar and
logic...").
100. To facilitate assessments of our coding decisions, we lay them out here
and elsewhere with some degree of specificity. We also have made our
database freely and publicly available on the intemet at http://
epstein.wustl.edu/research/rationales.html so that others can recode our data in
whatever ways they deem appropriate.
101. A notable example of the application of this canon in the tax area is the
limiting interpretation given to "other casualty" in the authorization of the
casualty loss deduction of I.R.C. § 165(c)(3), "fire, storm, shipwreck, or other
casualty..."
102. Under this approach, a court may consider the placement of a period or
comma, use of conjunctive or disjunctive, use of "may" versus "shall," use of
singular versus plural, or the confusion about terms such as "unless." See, e.g.,
Appleman v. United States, 338 F.2d 729, 730 (7th Cir. 1964); Rosenberg v.
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10. Statutory headings have no relevance.
11. Statutory headings have relevance.
12. Technical meaning: interpret words in accordance with
some background legal concept (like the category of
employee) or in line with a judicially developed term of
art103

13. Whole act rule: look to the context of the word or
provision by looking to the other parts of the statute 104 to
ensure that the will of the legislature is executed.
For each canon, we coded whether the Court (1) relied on it, (2)
refused to rely on it, (3) found the canon inconclusive, or (4) did not
discuss the canon but implicitly relied upon it. Because our interest
here lies in whether the Court relied on a canon when it reached a
decision, we focus exclusively on ()--cases in which the majority
(or plurality) opinion clearly invoked the canon to interpret the code.
Figure 4 displays the results of this focus, detailing the
proportion of cases in which the Court relied on each mode of
analysis. The plain and technical meaning rationales appear most
frequently in 15.34 percent and 18.47 percent of the 991 cases,
respectively. In contrast, in just .3 percent (n=3) of the 991 disputes,
the Court relied in part or in full on "drafting mistakes" as a reason to
reach a conclusion about an interpretive question.

C.I.R., 198 F.2d 46, 50 (8th Cir. 1952); United States v. Rogers, 122 F.2d 485
(9th Cir. 1941).
103. For example, "convenience of the employer" has been construed to
mean business necessity rather than convenient in the ordinary sense of
helpful.
104. For example, titles, preambles, privos, assumption of consistent usage.
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Proportion of Cases

Figure 4: Proportion of tax cases relying on text-based
rationales, 1912-2000 terms. N=99 1. °5
Overall, the Court invoked at least one of the textual canons in
39.46 percent (n=391) of the 991 cases-hardly a stunning figure in
light of the historical prominence of this approach, 10 6 not to mention
previous research. 10 7 Even so, recall that at least some scholars have
alleged a growing disenchantment with this form of analysis on the
Court's part (despite Scalia's advocacy of it), while others have
argued quite the opposite: that a noticeable increase in textualism,
105. N=991. "Other" includes: legislative history cannot be used to override
plain meaning (n=l1); words are susceptible to dual meanings (n=l1); language
must yield when it produces unfair or unintended results (n = 1).
106. See Wald, supra note 35, at 196-197.
107. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 39, at 657 (putting the figure for all

textual sources at 33 percent for the 1988 term); Eskridge, supra note 15, at
350 (listing a percentage of 48.5 for the 1978-84 terms at Table 8); Merrill,
supra note 39, at 355 (reporting the use of dictionaries in 33 percent of the
Court's 1992 term cases); see also Schacter, supra note 3, at 19 & n.60
(suggesting that 100 percent of the Court's 1996 term decisions relied in part
or in full on statutory language).
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and a decline in the use of legislative history, has occurred over the
last decade or so.
We will shortly jump into this controversy, comparing the
Court's reliance on textual and historical evidence. For now, we ask
whether the use of textual canons has varied over time, as some
commentators suspect. Figure 5 provides the answer, and it is quite
interesting in light of existing debates. 10 8 Prior to the 1970s, with
some term-by-term variation, the Court analyzed the Code's text in
no more than 50 percent of the cases. 109 Beginning in the mid-to-late
1
1970s-that is, well before Scalia arrived at the Court "-that
picture changed dramatically: the majority of decisions, and in some
terms the vast majority, relied in part or in full on a textual approach.
Put another way, during the longest natural court when Earl Warren
was Chief Justice (1958-61 terms),'11 the majority examined the text
in 47.06 percent of the 34 cases it decided. That figure is above the
overall mean of the entire series (39.46), but it is well below the
percentages for the longest periods of membership stability during
the Burger (1975-80 terms) and the Rehnquist Court's (1994-00
terms), of 62.07 (N=29) and 72.22 (N=18), respectively.

108. It is important to note that because we coded all rationales on which the
opinion writer claimed to have relied, it is possible the justices relied on one or
more approaches in addition to the various text-based canons we depict in
Figure 5.
109. We use windows of six terms, rather than single terms, to ensure at least
ten cases on which to base the illustrated proportions.
110. But see Figure 7 for a somewhat different (comparative) take on the
data.
11. A natural court is a period of stability in Court membership. See, e.g.,
Youngsik Lim, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Justices' Decision
Making, 29 J. LEGAL STuD. 721, 724 n.9 ("[A] natural court persists until its

composition is changed. That is, when a new justice is appointed to replace an
incumbent, a new natural court begins."); David M. O'Brien, Charting the
Rehnquist Court's Course: How the CenterFolds, Holds, andShifts, 40 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REv. 981, 981 n.5 ("Political scientists generally analyze the Supreme
Court in terms of 'natural courts,' periods in which the Court's personnel
remain stable.").
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on text-based
Figure 5: Proportion of tax cases relying
12
terms.
1912-2000
time,
over
rationales
Although we cannot necessarily generalize to other areas of the
law, at least in tax cases, it appears that textual analysis now plays a
critical role in statutory interpretation. This conclusion would hardly
surprise contemporary observers, but its genesis might: the steady
growth in use of textual canons may trace back to the onset of the
Burger Court or perhaps even to the late Warren Court-but
seemingly not to Scalia's appointment; the current trend appears to
have been well underway before 1986.
2. The Legislative Process: Intentionalism & Purposivism
Like textualists, intentionalists and purposivists subscribe to the
notion that the Supreme Court is the agent of Congress. These
theorists, however, argue that justices can best play this "agent" role
if they look beyond the language of the statute and consider3
congressional intent and purpose when reaching conclusions.'"
112. N--991.
113. The distinction between "intent" and "purpose" boils down to this:
when judges refer to "legislative intent," they generally have in mind an
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Intentionalists and purposivists, therefore, agree with textualists that
the underlying goal of statutory interpretation is to implement the
preferences of the enacting legislators; they argue, however, that
without context, words have no plain meaning. This insight leads
intentionalists and purposivists to argue that textualism is not only
incoherent for its single-minded focus on the words of the statute, but
ignoring legislative intent and purpose works to undermine the
democratic process."14 The textualist approach is allegedly antidemocratic because it ignores results the legislature intended and,
thus, privileges the justices' own idiosyncratic views regarding the
meaning of words-a meaning that may well differ from the
underlying legislative intent and purpose. Addressing the issue
directly, Justice Breyer has argued that if the Court adheres to the
rigid textualist method in the judicial decision making process, it will

interpretation of a statute that the legislators themselves had when drafting the
statute and would apply in the circumstances at issue. Karen M. GebbiaPinetti, Statutory Interpretation, Democratic Legitimacy and Legal-System
Values, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 233, 281-84 (1997). "Legislative purpose,"
by contrast, involves an interpretation that conforms to the broader policy
purposes of the statute-in circumstances that the legislators may never have
anticipated. See id. at 283. Both an intentionalist and a purposivist will
consult legislative history in making a determination. As one author put it:
Originalists find the legislative will through either "intentionalism" or
"purposivism."
Intentionalists (including Professors Edward 0.
Correia and Earl M. Maltz (in a modified form)) seek to apply statutes
in light of the legislature's original intent. In this subjective inquiry,
the court first seeks to determine the legislators' actual intent. Absent
evidence that the legislature actually considered and resolved the
problem presented, the court may scan the statute's context and
history to "imaginatively reconstruct" what the legislature would have
decided if it had actually considered the issue. Judge Richard A.
Posner is the leading modem advocate of imaginative reconstruction.
Purposivists use a more objective approach in which the court first
reviews the statute, its context, and history to discern the statute's
original purpose, then applies the statute in light of that underlying
purpose. Leading practitioners of purposivism include Justice John
Paul Stevens and the late Professors Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M.
Sacks.
Id at 281-84 (citations omitted).
114. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH.
L. REv. 20 (1988) (describing various originalist approaches to statutory
interpretation); J. W. HURST, DEALING wrrH STATUTES (1982); REED
DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES

(1975).
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produce absurd results, "15 ignore drafting mistakes, 16 fail to account
for specialized meanings,' 17 produce both over- and under-inclusive
interpretations of the law," 8 and dismiss reasonable interpretations to
controversial statutes. 119 In short, as a true agent of Congress, the
Court must look, not only to the text of the statute, but also to the
legislative history found in the floor debates, committee reports, and
other documents to understand and implement the law.
Textualists do not dismiss these criticisms but, instead, argue
that a few such unfortunate outcomes will force Congress to adopt
clear language in the drafting process, which will enhance democracy in the long run. The problem with this response, according to
the intentionalists and purposivists, is that it fails to reflect how
Congress actually works. Congress is a bureaucratic organization
with more than 20,000 employees working full-time and generating
legislation through complicated processes that involve interaction
with other institutions including the executive branch, business
organizations, labor unions, and public interest groups. These
realities lead intentionalists and purposivists to deem the textualists'
expectation-that Congress could, even if it wanted, update
20
legislation that passes through the courts-unrealistic and naive.'
Only when courts investigate and need legislative materials behind
the law's words can fair and workable outcomes result. 21 In short,
however, distinct intentionalism and purposivism 122 both place
115. See Breyer, supra note 49, at 848-50.
116. See id. at 850-51.
117. See id. at 851-53.
118. See id. at 853-56.
119. See id. at 856-60.
120. See id. at 869-74.
121. For example, if Congress adopts a statute prohibiting vehicles in the
park and intended the statute to reduce noise and pollutions, the two
approaches might lead to distinctly different outcomes in a dispute involving
the arrest of a bicyclist for riding around the park. An intentionalist Court
would look to the legislative history to determine if the members of the

legislature saw a bicycle as a "vehicle," and if so, would uphold the penalty
imposed. A purposivist Court, by contrast, would examine the purpose of the
statute and would conclude that the bicyclist did not cause the harm that
Congress sought to eliminate and would acquit. See Sunstein, supra note 94,
at 540 (providing an illuminating discussion of purposivism and intentionalism).
122. See supra note 113 (describing the distinction between intentionalism
and purposivism).
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emphasis on the process leading to a statute's creation. Accordingly,
in identifying decisions that relied on either approach, we looked for
the use of the following evidence, which was produced during the
law-making process:
1. Congressional knowledge of administrative and judicial
action: consideration of what Congress23 knew or could have
known when it adopted the provision.1
2. Coordination and consistency with other laws: assumption that Congress intended different parts of the tax laws to
be coordinated with one another.
3. Lack of legislative history: conducted search for legislative history but could not find any relevant sources to
assist in the interpretive process.
4. Legislative history, with the following coded separately:
"Congressional record (debate)
"Congressional bills
"Committee reports
"Congressional/committee hearings
"Congressional studies and analyses
5. Legislative inaction: consideration of legislative "inaction" in reaching a decision.
24
6. Post-enactment legislative history.1
7. Related statutes, including those provisions directly re25
lated to the same subject matter at issue.'
8. Speaker's status: identification of the status of the
speaker in any of the above contexts.
The results of this coding process indicate that, overall, the court
invoked at least one of these pieces of evidence in 59 percent
(n=585) of the 991 cases, but their individual use varies as Figure 6
123. For purposes of this project, we coded for instances in which the Court
indicated that Congress "actually knew" or "could have known" of judicial or
administrative action deemed relevant to the outcome.
124. This could include legislative history associated with the reenactment of
the same or similar provision. Thus, if the Court interprets section 22 of the
1939 Code but looks to the legislative history of section 61 of the 1954 Code,
it is looking at post-enactment legislative history.
125. For example, in interpreting a corporate reorganization issue, the Court
might examine various other related corporate reorganization provisions.
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illustrates. "Post-enactment history," for example, appears quite
infrequently while "related statutes" analysis appears quite
frequently (in 433 of the 991 cases). But, collectively, the traditional
sources of legislative history are what most often occupied the
justices. Combining the five components of this approach (congressional record, bills, reports, hearings, and studies and analyses)
yields a figure of 0.489; that is, in nearly half the cases, the Court
claimed to have relied, in part or in full, on some feature of the
code's history. Along these lines, committee reports clearly
dominate 126--a finding that would displease Justice Scalia 127 but one
that comports
with the Court's own rhetoric 12 8 and with other
129
studies.

126. See Eskridge, supra note 39, at 636 (deeming committee reports as
"most authoritative" under the "hierarchy of [legislative history] sources");
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 353 (1990).
127. As Eskridge reports, in speeches delivered between 1985 and 1986,
then-Judge Scalia leveled a strong attack on the use of committee reports: "As
an intermediate federal judge, I can hardly ignore legislative history when I
know it will be used by the Supreme Court. But it seems to me we can at least
be more selective in the sorts of legislative history we employ .... At the
bottom of my list I would place-what hitherto seems to have been placed at
the top: the committee report." Eskridge, supra note 39, at 651 n.117.
128. See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 474
(1921) ("By repeated decisions of this court it has come to be well established
that the debates in Congress... are not a safe guide... [to] ascertaining the
meaning and purpose of the law-making body. But reports of committees of
[the] House or Senate stand upon more solid footing, and may be regarded as
an exposition of the legislative intent... ." (citations omitted)).
129. See Wald, supra note 25, at 58 (concluding that committee reports were
the most frequently cited source of legislative history during the 1992 term);
Koby, supra note 25, at 390 (finding 50 percent of all legislative history
citations during the period between 1980-1998 were to committee reports).
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Figure 6: Proportion of tax cases relying on approaches
grounded in legislative intent or purpose, by component,
1912-2000 terms. N=991.
More dissensus in the extant literature exists over whether the
Court's reliance on legislative history has changed over time. Recall
that Brudney & Ditslear 130 and Merrill 131 found a decline in the
contemporary Court's reliance on legislative history and a
concomitant increase in its use of textual materials-as did Stephen
Breyer.132 Indeed, Justice Breyer went so far as to declare that
"[r]eferring to legislative history to resolve even difficult cases may
soon be the exception rather than the rule."' 133 Schacter, on the other
the
hand, found that during the 1996 term the justices invoked
"concept of 'intent"' in 49 to 84 percent of their opinions.' 34
See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 9 (manuscript at 34-37).
See Merrill, supra note 39.
See Breyer, supra note 49, at 846.
Id. at 846.
Schacter, supra note 3, at 14-15 (noting that the number increases to
84% if references to Congress' "will ...[,] desire... [or] purpose" are considered); see also Wald, supra note 20 at 309-10 (concluding that textualism
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
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Figure 7 takes three different cuts at this controversy. The top
panel considers whether the Court relied, in part or in full, on an
analysis of a section's legislative history; in other words, it is a
longitudinal version of the data presented in Figure 6 but draws only
on the congressional record, bills, reports, hearings, and studies and
analyses. The center and bottom panels consider the relationship
between textualism and legislative history, with the center panel
illustrating the proportion of cases relying nonexclusively on the
rationale,135 and the bottom panel focusing on the proportion of cases
relying exclusively on one or the other but not both.

gained currency with the Court during the 1988-89 Term); Wald, supra note
35 at 196-99 (discussing the pervasiveness of reliance on legislative history
during the 1981 Term); Wald, supra note 25 at 69-70 (concluding that, as of
the 1992 Term, there were seven justices who readily cited legislative history).
135. In other words, this panel compares the data in the top panel and that
displayed in Figure 5.
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Figure 7: Proportion of tax cases relying on legislative
history and textualism overtime, 1912-2000 terms. N=991
Taken collectively, several interesting patterns emerge from
these figures. Note first the rather dramatic jump in the use of
legislative history materials over time. During the first six terms in
our dataset, the Court did not consider the code's legislative history
even once. By the last six terms (1994-2000), it did so in 50 percent
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of the disputes. And yet, however comparatively high the figure of
50 percent may be, it is a good deal lower than the zenith of usage
(nearly 80 percent) reached by the end of the Burger Court. In other
words, the data lend support to those scholars who report increased
interest in legislative history materials during the 1960s into the
1980s, 136 but they also substantiate claims of declining interest
during the Rehnquist Court years. 137 Where the data cast some doubt
is over Breyer's prediction of the disappearance of legislative history
from the Court's decisions. 138 While the current Court may be less
inclined than its immediate predecessors to look to committee
reports, the congressional record, and other traces of the legislature's
to invoke these materials in about half its
intent, it continues
39
decisions.'
Yet another interesting pattern emerging from Figure 7 (the
middle panel) centers on the use of legislative history relative to
textual approaches. While the Court has increasingly relied on both,
transformations of some import may have occurred in the 1940s and
again in the late 1970s. Notice that up until (roughly) the Stone
Court, textual evidence dominated the justices' approach to statutory
interpretation but, just as Carro and Brann reported, 140 by the 1940s
(until the late 1970s) legislative history became more prevalent.
Then, in line with commentary by Eskridge and others, the tide
136. See, e.g., Carro & Brann, supra note 39. An alternative explanation for
the increased reliance on legislative history exists. The original statutes that
Congress adopted in 1909 and 1913 were simple, short and had almost no
legislative history. Over time, as Congress adopted additions and amendments,
it also built up a more comprehensive collection of relevant committee reports,
bills, hearings, etc. upon which the justices could rely. Thus, the changes in

judicial methodology may reflect the growth of the statute and the concomitant
growth in the legislative documents. This hypothesis raises an interesting em-

pirical question that requires an investigation into the available legislative

documents for the code provisions at issue in the court controversy. The inference that in each individual case the justices had more legislative documents

upon which to rely because many more such documents exist in the aggregate
is an inference vulnerable to the ecological fallacy (i.e., making inferences
about individual cases based on aggregate data for a group).
137. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 9 (manuscript at 37); Eskridge,
supra note 39, at 657; Koby, supra note 25; Merrill, supra note 39.
138. See Breyer, supra note 49, at 846.
139. See Fig.7.
140. Carro & Brann, supra note 39, at 298-99; see also Fisher & Harbison,
supra note 42.
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turned again: 141 historical sources remained important, but the
justices became increasingly inclined to rely on canons and
rationales associated with textualism. 142 Once again, though, and in
juxtaposition to some existing commentary,'14 that latter move
occurred well before Scalia arrived at the Court. 144 So, while his
presence may have accelerated the observed trend, he does not
appear to have initiated it-at least not in tax.
Finally, consider the data in the bottom panel of Figure 7.
Primarily, they support claims that it is rare for the Court to rely
exclusively on either textual or historical evidence. 145 But they do
tend to shore up Judge Wald's assertion that the "textualist approach
is not yet the law of the land."'146 At minimum, it seems that the
majority has yet to embrace the "new" textualist mantra that "once
the Court has ascertained a statute's plain meaning, consideration of
legislative history becomes irrelevant."' 147 Instead, the court seems to
adhere to the algebra teacher's.mantra: check your work.
3. Summary of the Legislative Regime
These specific patterns aside, recall that nearly 50 percent of the
Court's decisions invoked materials associated with congressional
intent and purpose. This figure is hardly trivial, but it pales in
comparison to the justices' overall deployment of the legislative
regime during the period and cases under analysis. Indeed, if we
combine the data on legislative "product" (textual approaches) and
on legislative "process" (purpose and intent), then we observe the
Court allocating power to Congress in 69 percent (n=688) of the 991
taxation cases resolved since 1912 (see Figure 15, which appears
later in the text).
This percentage fits comfortably with other studies, 148 and it
certainly indicates at least some stated degree of deference on the
141. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 9 (manuscript at 38-39); Eskridge,
supra note 39, at 657; Koby, supranote 25, at 395.
142. See Eskridge, supra note 39, at 656-665.
143. E.g., Koby, supra note 25, at 392, 395; Merrill, supra note 39, at 363.
144. See Fig.7.
145. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 9 (manuscript at 53); Eskridge,
supra note 15, at 347 n.38.

146. Wald, supra note 20, at 286.

147. Eskridge, supra note 39, at 623.

148. See Schacter, supra note 3; Zeppos, supranote 3.
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part of the Court's majority to legislative product and process-at
least over the ninety-year period included in this study. But do the
combined data mask trends in use over time, as was the case with
both text and legislative history?
Zeppos, in his analysis of a random sample of all statutory
interpretation cases, found little change. 149 Based on the data
depicted in Figure 8, however, we cannot say the same for tax alone.
Observe the growth in the size of the darker bars (which indicate the
Court's reliance on legislative product or process rationales, though
perhaps in combination with other theories of interpretation)-such
that during the earliest terms the Court claimed to have deferred to
the legislature in about 40 to 60 percent of the cases; by the later
terms, that range increased to 70 to 90 percent. The lighter bars,
indicating the use of a legislative regime and no others, reveal a
somewhat different pattern. During the first three term "windows"
the Court was more likely to rely solely on the legislative regime
than in the subsequent ten. Only beginning in the late 1980s did it
even approach the level of exclusive reliance on legislative rationales
seen in the earliest terms.

V._

Figure 8: Proportion of tax cases relying on a legislative
regime overtime, 1912-2000 terms. N=991
149. Zeppos, supra note 3.
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B. The Executive Regime
In Part V, we return to these interesting patterns. For now,
though, let us consider yet another regime, one centering on
deference to the executive. Like legislative models of decision
making, this one too reflects the view that the Court is the voice of a
democratically elected body and not an autonomous actor free to
implement its own preferences in legal controversies involving
statutes. Where this approach diverges from the legislative regime,
however, is that it requires the Court to defer to the agencies (in this
context, both the Internal Revenue Service [IRS] and the Treasury)
and not to the legislature; policymaking authority in the resolution of
doubtful cases is, thus, removed from Congress and the judiciary and
put into the hands of the executive. 150 By deferring to the IRS and
Treasury rulings and regulations, the Court effectively allocates
power from one branch to another and assures that accountable
actors-agents subject to executive control-make the policy
choices, and thus arguably avoids the countermajoritarian difficulty
presented when the Court takes control of the law-making process.
Many statutory theorists support this interpretive model for its
democracy-enhancing features; as Professor Jane Schacter notes:
[although the] agencies are not directly accountable to the
people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate
for this political branch of the Government to make such
policy choices-resolving the competing interests which
Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or
intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with
the administration of the statute in light of everyday
realities. 152
In addition to its ability to preserve majoritarian politics,
150. In the context of the Internal Revenue Service, the president selects the
Commissioner and the Chief Counsel. IRS, IRS History and Structure, at
http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=98142,00.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2005).
For a discussion of current appointees, see the Internal Revenue Service
website at http://www.irs.gov. The president also selects the Secretary of
Treasury. Id.
151. Bell, supra note 16, at 141-48 (describing arguments for relying on
executive interpretation of statutes); Schacter, supra note 2, at 616 (quoting
Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1994), for the
same proposition).
152. Schacter, supra note 2, at 616.

December 2005)

JUDGING STATUTES

1949

supporters of the executive model argue that this approach to
interpretation assures the best outcomes. Executive agencies consist
of experts who are equipped to make informed and knowledgeable
policy decisions, and, given their superior understanding of complex
problems, it is sensible to defer to this expertise in statutory
controversies. Countless tax professionals have argued that agency
deference is particularly important in the context of taxation-a
context in which the justices clearly lack such expertise and one in
which the IRS and Treasury officials are uniquely capable of
divining hidden congressional purpose given their roles in the
development of actual legislation. 5 3 The rule of deference, in short,
assures the Court will reach sound and predictable outcomes rather
than flawed or problematic answers to difficult interpretive
problems.
15 4
Two decades ago, in Chevron v. Natural Res. Def Council,

the Supreme Court confirmed the role of agencies in the interpretive
process by holding that federal courts should defer unless Congress
"has directly spoken to the precise question at issue."' 155 The
important point for purposes of this essay is not the idea that the
Court should defer to agency interpretations, but whether the Court
claims it defers and for how long it has been so claiming. To address
153. See Joel Newman, The Story of Welch: The Use (and Misuse) of the
"Ordinary and Necessary" Test for Deducting Business Expenses, in TAX
STORIES 154, 181 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2003) (the Justices frequently issue
opinions that are "needlessly confus[ing]"); Kirk J. Stark, The Unfulfilled Tax
Legacy of Justice Robert H. Jackson, 54 TAX L. REV. 171, 173 (2001) ("Tax
lawyers have derided the Supreme Court, complaining that the Court 'hates tax
cases' and generally bungles the cases it does hear."); Bernard Wolfinan, The
Supreme Court in the Lyon's Den: A FailureofJudicialProcess, 66 CORNELL
L. REV. 1075, 1099-1100 (1981) (arguing that Supreme Court tax opinions
have become the "laughingstock" of the bar and implying greater deference is
warranted to the experts in the field). Various other scholars, however, doubt
the value of deference to agencies.
See, e.g., MICHAEL LIVINGSTON,
TAXATION: LAW, PLANNING AND POLICY (2004) (critiquing the courts for
deferring to one of the litigant's interpretation of the law over the opposing
litigant's view); Sunstein, supra note 94, at 544-50 (critiquing deference as
inconsistent with separation-of-power norms).
154. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The court stated, "If... the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court
does not simply impose its own construction on the statute... [T]he question
for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute." Id. at 843.
155. Id. at 842.
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these questions, we inspected the 991 tax cases for judicial reliance
on the following documents.
1. Acquiescence or non-acquiescence: IRS announcements
indicating that in similar future cases it will follow (or that
it expressly refuses to follow) a U.S. Tax Court decision
that ruled against the Commissioner.
2. Private letter rulings: IRS rulings that provide
prospective advice on the application of law to a specific set
of facts that may not be relied upon as precedent by other
taxpayers.
3. Regulations issued by an 1agency other than the Treasury
or Internal Revenue Service. W
4. Revenue procedures: published procedures and methods
as the
for dealing with the IRS and addressing matters such
57
required content of a request for an advance ruling.'
5. Revenue rulings: IRS rulings that provide prospective
advice on the application of law to a specific set of facts
that may be relied upon as precedent by other taxpayers.
6. Technical advice memoranda: memoranda that apply
the law to a specific set of facts growing out of the
examination (audit) of a return (as opposed to prospective
advice). Like private letter rulings, technical advice memoranda also may not be relied upon as precedent by other
taxpayers.
7. Treasury regulations.
other documents including Chief
8.Other documents:
Counsel Memoranda, Actions on Decisions, Field Service
Advice, etc.

156. The most common example in the tax area consists of Labor
Department regulations interpreting or prescribing rules under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which sometimes impact
the application of the tax law's qualified pension and profit-sharing plan
provisions.
157. As a matter of administrative law, these are presumably binding
procedural rules, although not issued under notice-and-comment public
rulemaking procedures because they are exempt from them.
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For each of these sources, we determined whether the Court did
or did not defer to the executive and excluded those in which the
Court refused to give weight to ruling or regulation.
Across the entire period included in this study, the Court
invoked one or more of these executive generated sources in 27.25
percent (n=270) of the 991 cases (see Figure 15). As Figure 9
indicates, however, the justices paid almost no attention to revenue
procedures, private letter rulings, technical advice memoranda, and
acquiescence or non-acquiescence announcements. What did capture
the Court's interest were treasury regulations, on which it relied, in
part or in full, in 21 percent (n=215) of 991 cases.

Treasury regulations

Revenue rulings

Oher documents

Other regulations
Revenue procedures

(Non)Acquiscance

Technical advice mems

Private letter rulings
I

I

0

.05

I

.1

I

,15

proportion of Cases

Figure 9: Proportion of tax cases relying on executive
materials, by component, 1912-2000 terms. N=991.
While there is little commentary in the literature on the degree to
which we might expect changes over time in the invocation of this
regime, most of the emphasis, as we noted above, has been on the
use of legislative history versus textualism; scholars have not been
entirely silent. Eskridge, for example, suggests that Scalia and other
"new" textualists endorse the "procedural canon" of administrative
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deference and have become increasingly "aggressive in criticizing
Justices who are willing to use legislative history or purpose to
correct agency mistakes.' 5 8 If this is so, we might expect to see an
increase in the use of executive materials since Scalia's arrival on the
Court.
Do the data bear this out? Figure 10 provides the answer, and it
is mixed. Clearly, at least through the 1980s, we observe monotonic
growth in the Court's reliance on one or more components of an
executive regime (though, as the lighter bars indicate, rarely does it
rely solely on this regime). 159 A decline appears to have occurred
since the 1990s, and indeed, term-level data bear this out: only in
1996 did the Court defer to the executive in more than half the cases
it resolved. That is why we say the results are mixed. On the one
hand, we observe growth in the use of an executive regime over
time; on the other, it appears to have little do with Scalia. In fact, if
anything, the current Court has shown a greater reluctance than some
of its immediate predecessors to invoke agency-based materials.

Figure 10: Proportion of tax cases relying on an executive
158. Eskridge, supra note 39, at 665.
159. The Court's increased reliance on the executive regime may also be
explained by the increased number of executive documents available. See
supra note 39 for a discussion of this empirical question in the context of the
legislative regime.
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regime, by component, 1912-2000 terms. N=99 1.
C. JudicialRegime
While scholars and judges certainly recognize (and occasionally
applaud) the concept of "statutory stare decisis,"'160 as far as we
know, none have ever advocated giving complete control and
discretion over the interpretive process to federal judges; rather, all
see some role for the democratically elected bodies. Many statutory
theorists, such as Professors Dworkin and Eskridge and Judges
Posner and Calabresi, may urge judges to exercise discretion as coequal partners with the legislative and executive branches when
interpreting statutes, but they do not argue that judges should entirely
ignore statutory text, legislative history, and agency rulings when
reaching conclusions about the meaning of statutory provisions.161
Social scientists, in contrast, have long noted trends in the
decision-making process that strongly suggest justices make
decisions based on their own preferences without regard to statutory
law. 162 Our investigation also suggests that the justices are often
willing to allocate power and discretion to themselves, not as coequal partners, but rather, as the only relevant players in the
interpretive game. In reading the tax cases, it was apparent that the
Court regularly relied on judge-made rules for purposes of
interpreting the tax code. Surely this comes as no surprise to
scholars of statutory interpretation, many of whom have long
acknowledged the role of precedent in decision making. But the
extent of the Court's use of precedent may surprise even them: in
more than a handful of the cases (see Figure 15, which appears later
in the text), the Court never even cited to the statute at issue but
relied entirely on its own past rulings-this is especially true in the
years directly following adoption of the corporate income tax in
1909.
Since this approach to decision making is one in which judges
160. Eskridge, supra note 15, at 398. They also criticize it as well. For a
summary of their complaints, see id. at 397-98.
161. See infra notes 179-184 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 28, at 86-96; cf Segal, supra
note 28, at 28, 33 (explaining that the attitudinal theoretical model holds that
while judges do consider the facts of a case, a judge bases his decisions on his
sincere ideological beliefs and values).
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allocate power to themselves, we deem it a judicial regime. And we
attempt to capture it by analyzing the cases, not just for a reliance on
precedent, but also for their use of a set of substantive canons of
interpretation and broad policy rationales not found in the legislative
history or in agency rules but apparently considered relevant by the
Court.
Beginning with precedent, our protocols called for us to code
cases in which the majority opinion writer asserted that a prior ruling
served as a, or the, basis for interpretation (mere citations were
insufficient). In Cheek v. United States,163 for example, the Court
considered the definition of "willfully" as used in Sections 7201 and
7203 of the tax code 164 and referred only to its own past precedent
for making this determination-no text, legislative history, revenue
ruling or other evidence came into play. 165 We categorized Cheek as
a case that relied only upon judicial precedent in the interpretive
process. In Commissioner v. Schleier,166 in contrast, the Court
considered the tax consequences of liquidated damages received in
an ADEA claim under Section 104(a)(2), which excludes "the
amount of any damages received.., on account of personal injuries
or sickness."' 167 The government argued the ADEA damages were
punitive in nature and thus not covered by the tax exclusions. 16 8 The
Court agreed with this argument, noting that its opinion in Trans
World Airlines v. Thurston169 explicitly addressed and rejected the
taxpayer's argument to the contrary. 170 Unlike Cheek, Schleier also
163. 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
164. 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7203.
165. See Cheek 498 U.S. at 201-07. The majority in Cheek may have
believed its interpretation of "willfully" was implicitly sanctioned by Congress
given that the term has a long-standing definition in the common law that
Congress most likely understood when it adopted Code Sections 7201 and
7203. Our coding protocols, however, did not permit us to impute such beliefs

to the Court. That is to say that the Court may have believed their decision
reflected deference to the legislature, but nowhere in the opinion was this
deference mentioned nor did the majority opinion cite to any legislative
documents supporting such a belief.

166. 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
167. Id. at 333.
168. See id. at 326-27.
169. 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
170. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 331-32; see also Comm'r v. Estate of Hubert, 520
U.S. 93, 102 (1997) (citing Ithica Trust v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929)
as authority for decision that present-value principles should be used for
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involved reliance upon textual and substantive canons as well as
legislative history, but our point is that the Court stated that
precedent played a role in its analysis.
Overall, the Court used precedent in this manner in 35.02
percent (n=347) of the 991 tax cases; and in over a third of the 347
cases (n--1 18), precedent was the only rationale the Court gave for its
decision. This was far more typical (as already suggested) during the
earliest years in our data set than in later periods, as Figure 11 makes
clear. Note that while the use of precedent, in combination with
other modes of analysis, has not varied much over time (especially
not since the 1912-17 term window), the use of precedent alone has
declined substantially: until the 1960s, it was not unusual to see as
many as one in ten decisions relying exclusively on precedent; by the
1970s, that became a near rare event.

I,.illiiiiii
I

Figure 11: Proportion of tax cases relying on precedent,
1912-2000 terms. N--991.
In addition to precedent, we also considered whether the
valuing estate property).
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majority relied on the following substantive canons of statutory
interpretation--canons that emerge from judge-made rules and
operate to give the Court considerable discretion in the interpretive
process.
1. Constitutional problems: interpret the law to avoid
constitutional problems.
2. Deference to the trial court: defer to trial court interpretations in the taxation context.
3. Federalism concerns: interpret the law in a manner that
gives appropriate deference to the states.
4. General rule that tax statutes should be strictly
construed: interpret tax statutes narrowly in favor of the
taxpayer.
5. Presumption against implied exceptions: do not assume
Congress implicitly provides exemptions to taxation.
6. Presumption against implied repeals: do not assume
Congress intends to repeal a provision implicitly through
other actions (or non-actions).
7. Presumption against irrationality or injustice: assume
Congress did not intend irrational or unjust applications of
the law.
8. Rule of lenity: strictly construe the law if it is intended
to punish.
9. Other: all other substantive canons.
Figure 12 shows the proportion of cases in which the Court
relied on these canons and, as we can observe, none appeared with
any regularity. Topping the list was "irrationality," but the justices
of the 991 cases; for
made use of this canon in only about 9 percent
71
percent.'
5
under
was
figure
all others, that

171. Overall, the Court invoked at least one of these substantive rules in only
28.86% (n=286) of the 991 cases.
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Figure 12: Proportion of tax cases relying on substantive
rules, by component, 1912-2000 terms. N-991.
Finally, we inspected 72the opinions for reliance upon the
following policy rationales:
1. Administrative ease: asserts that a litigant's argument or
the Court's own decision is likely to promote or undermine
the administration of the tax laws.
2. Economic Growth/Economic Stability: these two categories present (in principle) instances of the use
of the tax
73
system to achieve macroeconomic objectives.
3. Horizontal equity concerns: addresses the consequences
of a litigant's argument or of the Court's own decision on
horizontal equity.
Horizontal equity implies equal
172. For each case, we coded whether the Court addressed the positive,
neutral, or negative effects the case would have on a particular policy
consideration. As long as the Court addressed the effect of its opinion
(whether positive, negative, or neutral), we coded this variable as present.
173. We coded growth and stabilization concerns under these categories
only; we reserved the penalty and subsidy category for other non-tax
objectives.
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treatment of taxpayers in similar circumstances, i.e., equal
economic income in the case of the income tax, or equal
wealth in the case of the estate and gift taxes.
4. Revenue raising concerns: addresses the consequences
of a litigant's argument or of the Court's own decision on
the federal government's ability to raise revenue.
5. Subsidies/Penalties: these categories reflect tax expenditure analysis-i.e., that Congress uses the tax law to
promote other goals (non-tax objectives) by offering taxbased inducement (special exclusions, deductions, credits,
reduced rates, or deferral privileges) to174engage in behavior
that Congress deems socially desirable.
6. Tax avoidance concerns: addresses the consequences of
a litigant's argument or of the Court's own decision on
taxpayers' ability to avoid paying taxes.
7. Transitional equity concerns: addresses the consequences of a litigant's argument
or of the Court's own
75
equity.1
decision on transitional
8. Vertical equity concerns: Addresses the consequences
of a litigant's argument or of the Court's own decision on
vertical equity. Vertical equity implies76that taxpayers at
different income levels are treated fairly. 1

174. Ordinarily, these rationales would be present only if the case involves a
provision of the statute that Congress enacted for the purpose of promoting
such extrinsic (i.e., non-tax) goals, and so the issue would be the proper or
intended trade-off between tax and non-tax objectives. Accordingly, these
rationales are likely to be present only if the legislative history of the provision

sub judice indicates that the tax system is being used to promote other goals;
therefore, we must code the statutory interpretation and legislative history
rationales.
175. The issue here is whether a change in tax rules imposes windfall gains
or losses on taxpayers who acted in reliance on prior law. Delayed effective
dates, phase-in rules and grandfather clauses are typical devices used to
cushion the impact of tax transitions, and cases involving such transition rules
are likely to invoke transitional equity as a rationale for the decision.
176. Progression means that as income rises, a larger proportion of the
taxpayer's income is taken in taxes (not simply that taxes increase with
income). Similarly, regression means that as income rises, a smaller
proportion of the taxpayer's income is taken in taxes even though the dollar
amount of tax may increase monotonically with income.
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Experts in tax policy tend to view the Court's reliance on policy
rationales as an example of judicial fidelity to implicit legislative
purpose; that is to say, while Congress may not explicitly mention
concerns associated with fairness, efficiency, administrative ease, or
revenue raising effects-these concerns are always present in the tax
context. Yet, as any tax scholar would acknowledge: the tax statute
contains so many exceptions to these general policy considerations
that it is virtually impossible to know exactly what the legislators had
in mind absent an explicit reference to a particular policy. While
Congress and the executive agencies at times address policy
concerns, the Court often invokes them even when the elected
branches have not done so, and we view this as an exercise of
judicial prerogative rather than deference to another branch of
government. Across all the terms in our data base, we found that the
justices made use of at least one of these rationales in 46 percent
(n=458) of the 991 cases.
At the same time, though, as Figure 13 shows, some rationales
received far more play than others. So, for example, while tax
avoidance concerns made their way into 14.33 percent (n=142) of the
991 cases, vertical equity considerations appeared in just five cases.

Avoidance
Horonts equity
mdrftra"i
Revenue
Penaties

Transitional equity
Subsidies

vertical equity
Eoonomc stabiyli
Economic growth

5s

.1

.15

Proportion of Cases

Figure 13: Proportion of tax cases relying on policy
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considerations, by component, 1912-2000 terms. N=99 1.
Equally interesting are the results of combining the three types
of evidence (past statutory precedent, substantive canons, and policy
considerations) upon which the Court relies when privileging its own
branch of government. Overall, the Court invoked a judicial regime
(though perhaps in combination with others) in a hefty proportion of
the 991 cases, .762 (n=755). That figure, which comports with
Zeppos' and Schacter's research, 177 is reasonably consistent across
the nine decades in our dataset, as Figure 14 shows. What has
changed markedly is the Court's sole reliance on past precedent,
substantive canons and policy consideration (indicated by the lighter
bars in the figure). While it regularly privileged its own judgment to
the exclusion of the other branches in early terms, by the mid-20th
century, that was no longer the case. These days, it is the relatively
rare decision that relies exclusively on "judicially-selected policy
norms.' 78

-

P

-

Figure 14: Proportion of tax cases relying on a judicial
177. Schacter, supra note 3, at 18 (showing that precedent is employed in

decisions 95 percent of the time or more); Zeppos, supra note 3, at 1093
(finding that 93.2 percent of all majority decisions rely on judicial sources).
178. See Schacter, supra note 3, at 26-28.
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regime, 1912-2000 terms. N=99 1.
D. The PartnershipRegime
A final group of statutory theorists argue the Court should not
eliminate its role in the decision-making process, but neither should
it elevate its own preferences above all others. This group sees the
federal judiciary as an equal partner with the elected branches of
government rather than a subservient agent. 179 Judges, it is argued,
are in a position to offer a "distanced reflection on questions that the
legislature alone cannot--or usually does not-address. The unique
position of judges to offer this distanced reflection provides the
necessary complement to the electoral accountability of the
legislature."'' 8 0 As Professor Schacter notes, the "complementarians"
are not identical in their viewpoints, but they all allow for
considerable judicial discretion in the interpretive process. '8 ' So, for
example, Guido Calabresi argues that because federal judges are
disinterested partners in the law-making process with no clear
constituency and, while the legislature suffers from the "burden of
inertia," judges should not hesitate to declare statutes "obsolete" if
the law is out of sync with the modem legal framework. 182 Other
commentators, such as Professor William Eskridge, assert that
statutory interpretation should be a dynamic process that allows for
judicial freedom and enables judges to reach the best substantive
179. See GuIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGES OF STATUTES
(1982) (arguing the judicial role in statutory interpretation should be similar to
that found in the common law context); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE
313 (1986) (proposing collaborative approach to statutory interpretation);
Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation,60 TEX. L. REv. 527, 541, 544 (1982)
(proposing that statutory interpretation is analogous to writing a chain noveleach player in the process writes a chapter including legislators and judges);
Eskridge, supra note 95, at 1556-60 (concluding that the best decisions have in
common "hard-hitting and candid analysis of a variety of legal sources for
figuring out what the text means"); see also Carlos E. Gonzilez, Reinterpreting
Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV. 585, 614-624 (1996) (summarizing
and agreeing with arguments that call for a co-equal role for the judiciary and
the elected branches of government); Schacter, supra note 2, at 608-11
(summarizing theories of statutory interpretation that call for collaborative
model).
180. Schacter, supra note 2, at 627 (citing to DwoRKIN. Supra note 179, at
313-54).
181. Id. at 630.
182. CALABRESI, supra note 179, at 64-65.
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results based on all the relevant legal and cultural evidence
available. 183 These scholars do not advocate complete judicial
discretion: statutory text and other originalist sources are relevant in
the interpretive process, but so too are changed circumstances,
current public values, and contemporary norms.184 The judiciary in
effect is in the position to adapt out-of-date laws to changed
circumstances rather than rely on the legislature to do so as the
legislative regimes mandate.
To capture the role of the partnership model in tax cases, we
looked to the Court's use of the legislative, executive, and judicial
materials we described above, and found that, overall, the justices
employed two or more regimes in 58.43 (n=579) percent of the
cases. Clearly, though, they were more eager to couple some
rationales than others, as Figure 15 indicates. They invoked judicial
and legislative evidence in combination the most often-in 32.69
percent (n=324) of the 991 cases. After this partnership approach,
we found a reliance on evidence from all three branches in 16.65
percent (n=165) of the cases; evidence from only the executive and
legislative branches in 6.16 percent (n=61); and from the executive
and judicial branches in just 2.93 percent (n=29).

183. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC INTERPRETATION, supra note 1.

184. Aleinikoff, supra note 114, at 21 (arguing for a partnership model of
statutory interpretations that understands a statute as an on-going process in
which both Congress and subsequent players have a role); Eskridge, supra note
95, at 1559-60 (1998) (arguing that judges must exercise humility in
interpreting statutes, and while they should be part critic, they must also be part
agent to Congress); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretationand Legislative

Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 317 (1989) (arguing federal courts should
consider any factors they deem appropriate if a statute's language is unclear);
Philip P. Frickey, CongressionalIntent, PracticalReasoning, and the Dynamic

Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1137, 1140 (1990) (arguing
federal courts should rely on both statutory text and contemporary public
values in the interpretive process).
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Figure 15: Proportion of tax cases relying on the partnership
model and on individual interpretive regimes, 1912-2000
terms N=991.
The fact that the Court used the partnership model in 59 percent
of the cases should lead readers to wonder about the other 41
percent-cases in which the court relied on evidence from just one
branch. Figure 15 provides the answer, depicting the number of
cases in which the Court relied solely on legislative, executive, or
judicial regimes, in addition to how often it adopted a partnership
model. As we can observe, the justices looked solely to legislative
materials in 13.93 percent of the disputes (n=138), and to IRS or
Treasury interpretations in just 15 cases (or 1.51 percent). Perhaps
the most surprising finding is that the Court relied only on judicial
forms of evidence in 23.92 percent (n=237) of the cases, eschewing
even the text of the statute itself! "Fidelity to the legislature" may be
"thought to satisfy the demands of democratic theory" and "judicial
legitimacy" may "depend[] on the court's doing the legislature's
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bidding rather than [its] own," as Schacter recently wrote.' 85 But one
own decisions-at least
would not know it by looking at the 1Court's
86
not in the 991 tax cases in this study.
V. SOME COMPARISONS: OVER TIME AND ACROSS LEGAL AREAS

We embarked on this project to consider changes in the modes
of statutory analysis over time and across legal areas. In what
follows, we provide some data on both, with the end result being, as
readers will see, far more questions than answers.
A. Trends in the Court'sAnalysis of the Tax Code
Most of our analyses thus far have focused on the Court's use of
particular types of rules and evidence across the last nine decades.
Along the way, we explored some trends over time-primarily in an
effort to illuminate contemporary debates over, say, the purported
decline in the use of legislative history and the ascendancy of
textualism. Of greater concern to us, though, and as we hope we
have made clear throughout, is the Court's reliance on particular
regimes. That is because, to state the case succinctly, the deployment of any one regime or combination thereof may have important
implications for all players in the interpretive game.
Figure 15, of course, provided some indication of the use of
these regimes in the tax context. But, as it turns out, those aggregated data once again mask important trends over time-as Figure 16
reveals. Looking across and down the figure, it appears that, in
general, the Court has increasingly invoked all the regimes since it
first began interpreting the code in 1912: in all three instances, the
proportion of use now is greater than it was during the first term
window (.071 versus .308 for the Executive Regime; .393 versus
.923 for the Legislative Regime; .679 versus .769 for the Judicial
Regime)-so much so that we might simply conclude that the Court

185. Schacter, supra note 2, at 594.

186. On the other hand, as we show in Part V, some change has occurred

over time, such that the contemporary Court is more likely to deploy a
legislative, rather than judicial regime.
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of today feels a far greater need to justify its decisions with reference
to executive, legislative, or judicial evidence than ever before. 87 But
that conclusion would ignore interesting variation within and among
the various regimes. So, for example, while reliance on IRS and
Treasury interpretations has increased over time, the Court has never
given the executive branch the level of deference awarded to the
legislature or the judiciary. Moreover, as we saw in Figure 10 and
despite some commentary to the contrary, the Court may have
prioritized its own judge-made rules through the 1950s, but, by the
1960s, it became more willing to claim deference to the legislature,
thereby appearing to constrain its own discretion in the interpretive
process.
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Figure 16: Proportion of cases using the three regimes over
time. N-991.

187. Simple bivariate logistic regression models of each regime on time
provide limited confirmation. In each model, "time" produced a statistically
significant coefficient (p < .05).
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What explains these interesting patterns? Certainly a legalistic
explanation would suggest that the availability of relevant documents
predicts judicial reliance on the different regimes. But a social
science explanation might also investigate inter-branch politics.
Along these lines, it would seem reasonable to hypothesize that the
(Republican) Court's declining deference to the executive in 1990
reflected the ascendancy of Bill Clinton to the White House. By the
same token, we might speculate that the Warren Court's extensive
use of legislative materials in the 1960s reflected preference
compatibility with Congress, and that today's Court's renewed
interest in the judicial regime reflects the increasingly Republican
composition of the federal bench. Then again, politics is just one
possibility; we can imagine that many other factors-but especially
internal court dynamics 18 8-help explain the adoption of a particular
regime(s) in a given case, and we are now hard at work sorting
through the possibilities.
B. A Comparison:Regimes in Civil Rights versus Business Cases
Throughout this article, we have drawn comparisons with other
studies that systematically explored the use of rationales. Almost
needless to write, those comparisons were gross and tentative at best.
That is because the extant studies are less alike than they are
different: more often than not, the authors develop distinct
approaches to categorize the justices' reasoning and include
dissimilar rationales within those categories. They focus on a wide
range of laws and legal areas, and they cover divergent time periods.
Fortunately, though, there is at least one paper from which we
can make more precise comparisons: Brudney & Distlear's analysis
of the canons of construction used by the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts (1969-2003 terms) in workplace-related cases. 189 Because
these scholars provide sufficient details on how they coded each
canon or rationale and because their research procedures are quite

188. See, e.g., Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 9 (exploring the relationship
between the employment of particular canons of construction and the size of
the majority coalition); Zeppos, supra note 3, at 1111 (suggesting that the
Court's internal dynamics may explain the use or rejection of particular
authoritative sources).
189. Brudney & Distlear, supra note 9 (manuscript at 33-41).
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similar to our own, 190 we are able to match our data with theirs' 9 ' which they generously supplied us. In particular, they provided us
with information on work-related suits involving race or gender. A
comparison of these disputes with our tax cases may enable us to
determine the extent to which we and others can generalize about the
justices' reasoning from one legal area to the next.
As it turns out, inferences from law-to-law are more reasonable
on some rationales than others. To see this, consider, first, the top
panel of Figure 17, which compares our tax data to Brudney &
Distlear's civil rights data on several specific components of the
legislative regime (actually on all those that were readily
comparable).' 9 The data on two components-legislative product
(i.e., attention to textual materials) and legislative process (i.e., use of
sources designed to identify the legislature' purpose or intent)-are
virtually indistinguishable. On legislative inaction, in contrast, a
rather large difference emerges: the justices reference congressional
silence in only 11.54 percent of the 130 civil rights cases. That
figure was less than half that for tax cases (25.34 percent of 147). In
190. For example, they did not limit themselves to one "primary" rationale,
nor did they code a rationale or source as present if the majority simply
mentioned it: it had to be "probative" or "determining." Id.
191. Some limitations exist. One limitation is coverage: our data set begins
in 1912 and ends in 2000; theirs begins in 1969 and ends in 2003. See id. For
purposes of comparison, we used data from the 1970-2000 terms (the first civil
rights cases in their database are from the 1970 term). Another limitation is a
problem that would plague virtually any comparison of this sort: we and they
categorized rationales in somewhat different terms. When in doubt, we did not
attempt to evaluate our data against theirs. Specifically, in using their data set,
we made the following decisions:
1. We only include reliance on a rationale if Brudney & Ditslear
coded it as "2" (genuine or positive reliance) or "3" (source is "a" or
"the" determining factor).
2. To create the legislative product (text) variable, we combined their
variables textm, dictm, lancanm.
3. To create the legislative process (intent and purpose) variable, we
combined their variables leghism, legpurm, leginam.
4. To create the legislative regime variable, we combined the
variables listed above under legislative product and process.
5. To create the judicial regime variable, we combined their variables
sctprem, comlawm, subcanm.
6. We treated their agdefin variable as akin to our executive regime
variable.
192. See supra note 174.
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light of the emphasis dynamic theorists place on the legislative
93
inaction, this result is worthy of further study.1
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Figure 17: Proportion of civil rights and tax cases using the
three regimes, 1970-2000 terms. N=130 for civil rights;
N=147 for tax. The Legislative Process variable includes
Legislative Inaction; the Legislative Regime variable
193. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 15, at 403 (noting that the Court's
"invocation of special stare decisis for statutory precedents, legislative
inaction, and subsequent legislative history is a signal that it is readjusting its

own preferences to avoid an override ....

).
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includes Legislative Product and Legislative Process.
The data displayed in the bottom panel of Figure 17 shows a
similar pattern of reliance in particular regimes. Once again, the
figures for two of the regimes-Legislative and Judicial-are nearly
identical but not so of the Executive Regime: the justices employ
materials associated with agency deference in 47.62 percent of the
tax cases (n=1 11) but only in 8.46 percent (n=l 1) of the civil rights
disputes. It is certainly possible that some of the variation exhibited
in Figure 17 may be due to distinctions between Brudney &
Ditslear's coding procedures and ours. But, it seems more plausible
that the observed difference in the Court's regard for the executive
branch may have less to do with coding and far more to do with the
specific areas of the law under analysis. As we have already noted,
scholars and professionals alike contend that deference to the IRS
and Treasury is particularly important in tax cases due to the justices'
lack of expertise. 194 We know of no such argument in the civil rights
context.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The Court's divergent approach to reaching decisions in civil
rights and tax points to a danger in drawing inferences from one law
(or legal area) to the next. It also underscores a claim we made at the
onset: if we are to develop a full picture of statutory interpretation,
we must pay greater attention to the range of disputes-whether
centering on labor, civil rights, economics, or even tax.
This is but one lesson of our analysis; we have described others
throughout. Most important is the attention that our analysis draws
to the lessons we have yet to learn. So, for example, we found an
unusual willingness on the part of the current Court to deploy a
legislative regime. Why? Greater political uncertainty? Preference
alignment with the legislature? Past rebukes from Congress? More
complex legislation? We could ask similar questions about interbranch relations: if our findings about the increasing use of the
legislative regime is peculiar to tax, does it explain why tax decisions
are particularly susceptible to legislative scrutiny and even
overrides, 195 as Eskridge might suggest? 196 If so, why do the justices
194. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 83.
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continue to invoke textual and historical sources in this area of the
law? Are they attempting
to invite a legislative response, as Spiller
197
argue?
might
and Tiller
Possible answers are near endless, as are the many other
questions our data raise. Seen in this way, our investigation merely
serves to show that however far the study of statutory interpretation
has moved over the last decade or so-and it has advanced
considerably-it still has some distance to travel. Pushing the
project along could, of course, take many forms. We have employed
but one-an approach that relies heavily on what "is" rather than
what "ought" to be19 8-but we surely do not want to discourage
scholars from using another or others that would contribute to the
larger enterprise.

196. Recall that Eskridge, supra note 15, among others, see supra note 20,

has argued that Congress is more likely to overturn decisions invoking the
plain meaning of a law. Another group of scholars suggests quite the opposite
(the legislature is more likely to overturn decisions grounded in legislative
history). See supra note 21. But either way, they seem to suggest that
exclusive reliance on a legislative regime may invite congressional reaction.
197. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
198. See Schacter, supra note 3, at 56 (claiming that the "approach of legal
scholars to the 'ought' is insufficiently informed by a systematic study of the
'is').

